‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي." [ظ‎‎٥‎٨] (٣٨٦/١٢١)

18
BO i ne to the Far Fast in time of peace, but had no serious significance in case
of war, so long as it was not fortified and provided with communications Oy
land with a Russian base.
It was agreed that in reality the most effective check to Russian progress
towards South Persia lay in the completion of the railway from Constantino;,,e
to Baghdad, as it would bring the Turks in force on the flank of a Russia,,
advance, and that it would be a great mistake to oppose the project which wo
ouriit, on the contrary, to encourage to the best of our power, provided wo can
acquire our proper share in the control of the railway and of its outlet on the
Persian Gulf. .
3G The opinion of Lord Curzon’s Government was invited m a telegram
from the Secretary of State, dated the 3rd September 1903, on the proposals
thus formulated,
37 Meanwhile in May 1903, yet another pronouncement more weighty,
clear and unmistakeable than its predecessors, was made to the world by the
Marquess of Lansdowne in the House of Lords in respect to British polmy m the
Persum Gulf. He declared that in the Persian Gulf the policy of His Majesty s
Government aimed at the protection and promotion of British commerce, and
that while their efforts were not directed to the exclusion of the legitimate trade
’ of other Powers, they would regard the
Public declaration of British policy. establishment of a naval base or of a
fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace
to British interests, and would certainly resist it with all the means at heir
disposal. In the course of conversation on the following day the Russian
Ambassador in London alluded to this declaration of British policy, and Lord
Lansdowne took the opportunity to broach the question of an understanding
between the British and the Russian Governments m regard to the policy
of the two countries in Persia. He explained that the British Government
recognized the preponderance of Russia in North Persia, while they themselves
had special interests in the Gulf, in the Southern ports and m Seistan, and
would certainly regard with serious apprehension any attempt on the part ot
Russia to construct a railway from the North which would threaten the
frontiers of India on the Baluchistan side. Count Benckendorf declared that
Russia had no intention of establishing a naval base in the Persian G ulf, and
that it was most unlikely that they would undertake any scheme of railway
construction such as that described. He doubted, however, whether the situa
tion was yet ripe for any general discussion as to affairs in Persia, where it
would be difficult to draw a hard-and-fast
line between British and Russian interests
without raising questions which might
five rise to trouble. Subsequent overtures made it clear that the Russian
Government shared the views of their Ambassador, and were not prepared to
consider any proposals for the partition of Persia into spheres of influence.
38. The consideration of the question on which the opinion of Lord Curzon’s
Government was desired in September
• Vide paragraph 36 ante. ig()3 * ^ deferred until Lord Curzon had
had an opportunity of discussing the question in person with Sir A. Hard in ge
during his visit to the Persian Gulf which took place later in the year. A reply
was finally sent in Pebruary 1904.
There were several remarks in the papers submitted to them, with which
the Government of India did not find themselves in agreement. They did not
ao-ree that, if Great Britain found it necessary under any conditions to occupy
a port or ports in the Persian Gulf, Germany, Prance, and Turkey wouh
necessarily or naturally do the same. The situation in the Persian Gulf bore
1 itf.l a nr no resemblance to that in the Gulf, of Pechili ; and there was not
Overtures to the Russian Govermnent
regarding the partition of Persia into
spheres of influence-
the same provocation to international rivalry.
Nor did the Government of India believe that if the occupation of ports
or territory in Southern or Eastern Persia brought Great Britain into conflict
with Russia, Prance would necessarily join the latter.
They differed also from the view that our political and strategical
interests would be adequately protected only by an understanding uhh