‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي." [و‎‎٩‎٣] (٣٨٦/١٩٠)

CHAPTER XIII.
Raods f Hoad guards and Hail roads.
The main sphere of British activity in the improvement of communications
in Persia lay in Arabistan. As long ago as 1882, the late Shah expressed
his willingness to construct a waggon road from Tehran to Mohammerah vid
Buruiird. Her Majesty’s Government had since then constantly advised the
Shah to construct the road, but the best opportunity for urging the matter
presented itself during Sir H. Drummond Wolffe’s Mission to Persia m
1888 when he secured from the Shah the opening of the Karun (October
1888) to navigation as far as Ahvvaz, and a service was established on the river
by the Tigris and Euphrates Steam Navigation Company. Above this point
the navigation was reserved to Persian subjects and the Moin-ut-Tujjar held
the concession. But the Company did not allow itself to bo deterred by this
reservation from attempting to extend their sphere of operations. A vessel
was presented in 1890 to the Shah and placed upon the upper reaches, where,
by an understanding with the Persian Government, it plied under the command
of a British Captain, and maintained connection with the steamers on the lower
river. However, the limit of navigation, whether at Ahwaz or Shuster, was still
distant from the trade marts of the Persian plateau; and without further
means of communication, the concession of 1888 was of little avail.
2. The importance of road communication to the capital was apparent;
and in 1890 the Imperial Bank of Persia acquired from Yahya. Khan Mushir-
ed-Dowleh the concession which the Shah had granted him in 1889 for the
construction of a road from Tehran to Ahwaz vid Kum, Sultanabad, Khorem-
abad and Dizful and a supplementary concession secured the right to construct
a branch from Burujird to Ispahan The Board of the Imperinl Bank of
Persia was considerably influenced to obtain this concession by Sir H.
Drummond Wolife who considered the road enterprise as the fundamental basis
of commerce and the probable commencement of other important affairs.
3. Circumstances necessitated commencement of the work at the Tehran end
and the first section from the capital to Kum (98 miles) was completed and in
working order in 189G. In 1898 the Bank obtained a supplementary concession
authorising prolongation of the road from Kum to Ispahan (160 miles) the import
ance of which will be apparent in the subsequent history of the road in connection
with the Bakhtiari road to be discussed later. In 1898 the section Kum to Sultana-
bad was also in working order. But the Bank found that the estimates for
construction, framed when they acquired these concessions, were far below the
actual expenditure incurred and that they could not affoid to engage in f ur
ther construction work without financial support from Her Majesty s Govern
ment or other parties. In August 1900 and again in May 1901, they applied
for such financial support from the British Government as would enable
them to interest capitalists in the undertaking; but Lord Salisbury while
fully recognising the importance of the enterprise felt unable to incur financial
responsibility for a work undertaken entirely in a foreign country.
4. On the 20th April 1901, however, the Secretary of State addressed the
Government of India asking for their views on a suggestion of .Sir A. Hardinge
to rive the Bank financial assistance. He thought that it might be possible
to induce Messrs. Lynch & Co. to fuse their interest in the Karun with the
scheme for opening up the road to connect the waterway with Central Persia
and that the subsidy paid to them might be temporarily increased by £2,000 or
£3 000 a year. The despatch was followed up by a telegram of the 12th June
in which the Secretary of State intimated that the Bank urged the expediency
of utilising their concession without further delay but considered either a
guarantee or annual subsidy of £12,000 necessary to raise the funds. The
Secretary of State asked for the view's of the Government of India especially
with regard to the incidence of any charges on this account. Lord Ourzon
replied on the 19th June to the effect that the Government of India felt no
keen commercial interest in either the Ahwaz-Tehran road or the Karun navi
gation but that possibly some political advantage beneficial to India and to His
Majesty’s Government might result. The figures were not, however, intelli
gible, for an annual subsidy of £12,000 was exorbitant. The construction of a