‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي." [ظ‎‎٥‎٩] (٣٨٦/١٢٣)

fO
wider policy which we have credited her with holding in view. The despatch
continued as follows : —
“If Russia were to mako any one of the forward movements culminating in the occu
pation of Persian territory, that we have described, we think that Great Britain should at onco
retaliate by a corresponding movement, along the frontiers accessible to her forces by land or
Tins movement would not be in the nature of a hostile advance, or an invasion of the
country, or a permanent occupation of foreign soil. ^ e should enter 1 ersia because we claim
an absolute equality of interest in that country with Russia, and with a view, by discussion to
re-establish the equilibrium, which by her initial action she would have violently disturbed.
We should eater as the supporters of the dynasty, in order to ensure a return to the status quo
ante, and to save those parts of the country lying nearest to our borders or in which our
interests are paramount, from the risks of disorder that could hardly fail to be aroused by the
news of an undi puted o cupation by a foreign Power, and that would equally atfecfc the
security of Persian interests and our own. Above all, althmgbthis may sound paradoxical,
we should enter in order to accel. rate, under proper conditions, evacuation by the Russians as
well as ourselves. Tin 1 places at which snob actions are open to us are, broadly speaking, four in
number,—namely, Seistan, Bunder Abbas, Bushire, and Moliammerah. Of t iese an alvance
on Seistan, or the occupation of Bunder Abbas and the adjacent islands, or the two in com-
bination, would undoubtedly produce the greatest impression upon Russia, since if persisted in
they would cut right across the lines of her Asiatic policy aud would imperil the attainment of
her ultimate ends. The occupation of Moh immerah would probably produce a greater moral'
effect upon the Persians from its greater proximity to the capital, more especially if it were
accompanied or followed by the threat of a movement upon Ispahan. On the whole, as it
would be more imp >rLant at such a juncture to inHuenee Russia than to frighten Persia, w&
should recommend the firsc in preference to the second plan of action. If Russia were to-
advance upon Tabriz or Meshed (or a, fortiori upon Tehran), we would at ouoe push forward
a force to Seistan, and we would move the fleet t> Buoder Abbas. The occupation of that
port and of the adjacent islands is merely a question of running up a flag, which would be
eagerly welcomed bv the inhabit mts, who are not Persians, but Arabs. The general principle
to be observe!, according to our view, w T oald be that for every movement made by Russia a.
corresponding movement should be mule by ourselves, but that each move nent shoul i be'
acc>mpnnied by an invit tion to open a discussion with a view to the resumption of the status
quo. 3 *
^Ylmt would be the probable consequences of our action ? The ulterior
objects of Russian policy in Persia are three in number : (1) to reach the Persian
Gulf, (2) to acquire such control over Persia as to convert it into an exclusively
Russian market, (3) by means of (1) to be in a position to apply pressure on
the flank of Great Britain. The occupation by British forces of Seistan and of
the mouth of the Gulf would be a serious, if not an insuperable, barrier to the
realisation of thes; ambitions, and would before long bring home to the Russian
Government the advantages of an early discussion aud settlement with ourselves.
There was, however, one aspect of the case upon which the Government of
India laid the greatest stress. The surest, indeed the only, preventive of such
action on the part of Russia was that she should know in advance what would
be the consequences of her action. The first condition of the policy thus recom
mended was that, not only the Persian Government but the Russian Govern
ment sh mid l)e clearly informed of the action that our reiterated pledges to>
uphold the integrity of Persia would cnnpel us, in certain contingencies, to
take. Lord Curzon’s Government even thought that the knowledge that Great
Britain was thus prepared to resist the destruction of tire independence of Persia
might predispose the Russians to enter upon a discussion with us as to the sole
means, apart from artificial resorts, by which that independence would be
permanently maintained, namely, financial and administrative reform.
“ We now pass to an examination of the wider issue that would be raised by an invasion
in force of the whole of Northern Persia by the Russian arms. In such a case we think tint,
our r-^ply is equally clear. We would retaliate by the occupation of Seistan an! of the poit
and islands oc Bunder Abbas We would land a British force at Bushire for the protection
of British interests and t .e support of a constituted authority there. We would do the same
at M >ham>nerah in s ipport ot the authority of the Sheikh, who, there can be little doubt,
would welcome our appearance. In all these places we would explain that we came to save
the country fr>m di raption anl to vindicate the existing order. At Mohammerah it would
be for consideration whe her our commercial or political interests on the Karan river required
the despatch of British troops to Ahwaz or Sinister, We would, however, most certainly not
leave out of sight this most valuable corner of the Persian dominion!, both because of its
intrinsic importance, because of the known sympathies nf its Chiefs and people with the British
cause, and beciuse, if we leave the field open, others will not fail to enter it.”
There remained the question raised by Sir A. Hardinge, whether the
occupation of Mohammerah and the Karun river should be followed by a
military advance upon Ispahan. The answer to this question seemed to depend
upon two contingencies, on neither of which was it possible to pronounce with