‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي." [و‎‎٥‎٥] (٣٨٦/١١٤)

“3. We have, therefore, decided to send to Your Lordship for communication to His
Majesty’s Government, in such manner as you may deem desirable, a Minute on this
aspect of the case which has been written by His Eictllency the Viceroy, and with which
we desire to record our complete agreement. We endorse the view expounded by him that,
while there is no objection to the granting of such commercial access to the Persian Gulf, by
Persian railways or otherwise, to Russia or to any other Foreign Power, as their own
mercantile necessities or the expanding recpiiiements of Persia may demand, the acquisition
of Political interests or rights by the Russian Government in those quarters would be fraught
with positive danger to the security of the Indian Empire ; and we hope Hiat any such
idea or proposal may continue in the future, as it has done in the past, to meet with the
strenuous opposition of His Majesty’s Government.”
Minute by His Excellency the Viceroy on Russian ambitions in Eastern
Persia and the Persian Gulf.
It may be safely assumed that the great activity now being shown by the Russian Gov
ernment and by Kussian agents in the direction of Khorasan, Seistan, Sarhad, ard Eastern
Persia in "funeral, arises, partly from alarm at the success that is attending the Indian trade-
route to Seistan and the marked revival of British interest in that part of the Indian frontier,
still more from a desire, while Great Britain is otherwise engaged, to accelerate that solution of
the Central Asian question to which, ever since the apocryphal will of Peter the Great,
Russian ambitions have been fondly turned, r/z., the absorption of Pers;a, the connection
of Russian territories by railway with the Indian Ocean, and t e acquisition oi a fortified
naval base in the Persian Gulf. 1 propose to examine how far the realisation of these
ambitions would be injurious to British interest-.; a conclusion upon which point is a
necessary preliminary to the decision how far they should either be tacitly acquiesced in or
openly opposed,
2 The argument that Russia can fafely be permit ed to secure a maritime outlet for
herself in the Persian Gulf, and that it is desirable that Great Bream should assist,, or at
least not withstand, her in that consummation resls ufon a fundamental cenfusion of
ideas. Those who employ it fail altogether to discriminate between commercial pleas and
polit’cal ambitions. It may be urged that, whereas, Eussian manufacturers, in their attempt
to gain access to Eastern markets, are at present compelled to make the long and circuitous
■journey by the Black Sea, the Medit. rranear, the hues Cana , and the Red -ea, before they
oan reach the Indian Ocean, it would be an advant ,ge could they be transported by rail-roads
either from the Caucasus, or from the Caspian to the Persian Gulf; although the apparent
value of such a .rain would probably be a good deal discounted in practice by the com.
naratively limited trade of Russia (which, however, may admit of a considerable development
,n the future), still more bv t he superior cost of land carnage over sea carnage. In so far as
these are the ambitions of Russia, it is rot probable that any one would seriously resist
t eir satisfaction. They can be accomplished-provided the money be for.heom,og-by ami
cable arrange,, ents with Persia and with Great Britain. I am not myself a believer in the
paying capacities of a trans-Persian line for many years to come. The country itself is poor,
and cimno? furnish either the capital or the traffic. Were the line however, an open line tt might
conceivably attract the Kussian trade from one end, and the Indian trade from the other,
which would enable it to subsist. It is also conceivable that enpltahsts might be wtlling to
oome forward and construct it, though were I a cap.tal.st, I should not be found among their
mimber—and arrangements might be made by winch, while the hue remained Persian
mCrty the construction and maintenance of the northern portion might bo entrusted to
Russia ^and those of the soothern portion to Great Britain, a joint guarantee of the three
Governments being applied to the whole. This railway might terminate on the Gulf in a
PeS port, open to'the commerce of all nations, but subject to the Import and Export dues
nrescHhed by the Persian tariff. I should myself regard such a venture as premature and as
speculative in the highest degree ; but I do not seeanything in it that need neiessanly aiouse
political j. alousy or international complicationg. _ . A .
d This however, though the sentimental advocatrs of handmg over Pcrs.a to Russian
. „ 1 ’ 1 1 : a vvot in the least what Russia wants. What she desires is a
“rvi t SSks is rsscasr*
whom 8 I have alluded as at all realise this conception defend it upon the following grounds
4 It i9 sa id that ports do not give sea-power, and that a Russian port m the Persian Gu f
would in no wise add to her strength, because she has no fleet adequate to'leend .
might he tmeas long as Russia consented re she^s few ports ;
ari d'^hat S as &o r oB^as t }ier f marit1aie 0 outle t ts are securwl 0 and fortihed, 'the fleet will follow r^th no
defay mid^n^roportionate strength. ^If^we^projectjiur gare for only ^^"of the
Bosplhc rtuf andth™ Daidanelles, when she will have obtained a naval statim somewhere in the