‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي." [ظ‎‎١‎٨‎٧] (٣٨٦/٣٧٩)

116
in tlie defence of her interests were to occupy ports or territory in Southern or
Eastern Persia, and were thereby to come into conflict with kussin, b ranee
would necessarily join the latter, and confront us with a Franco-Russian mill-
Try combination We differ from the views that have been expressed n some
quarters upon the construction of the Baghdad Railway as a flank defence to
the position of Great Britain in Southern Persia and the Gulf, and we deprecate
the idea that our political and strategical interests in those regions can on y le
adequately protected by an understanding with Germany. In our view the
interests of Germany in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf are more likely to
he antagonistic than favourable to our own ; and we see no sufficient ground tor
thinking that there is any international combination to which we should look
as a buttress to our interests or influence in that quarter, lliese views are
expressed independently of the question, which has never been referred to us
for opinion, of the ultimate completion of the German Asia Minor Kail way
to the Gulf; for we presume that it is an accepted principle with His Majesty s
Government that, should the line ever be continued south of Baghdad, tins
cannot he done without British co-operation and consent; and that no terminal
port can be selected, unless a similar consent has been obtained, and unless
the port is made open and international in character : further, if these views
are also entertained by His Majesty’s Government, wc think that nothing
but good could result from Germany being made acquainted with them, lest,
when her railway reaches Baghdad, she might complain of ha\ing been kept
in ignorance of British policy and intentions.
82
Telegram, dated the 26th November 1902.
From—His Excellency the Viceroy, Viceroy’s Camp,
To—His Majesty’s Secretary of State for India, London.
Sheikh of Mohammerah. Sir A. Hardinge’s telegram of 23rd November
to the Foreign Office. Without venturing an opinion upon exact terms of
assurance, I desire strongly to support the general position of Hardinge. Our
weakness in Persia arises largely from failure to support those Chiefs and
officials who incline to our side. If there is a Chief entitled to such support,
it is the Sheikh of Mohammerah, and if there is a part of Southern Persia
where British interests specially demand protection against foreign competition
or intrigue, it is the mouth of the Karun.
83
No. 13 (Secret—External), dated Fort William, the 1st March 1900.
From—The Government of India in the Foreign Department,
To—The Right Hon’ble Lord Georgb F. Hamilton, His Majesty’s Secretary
of State for India.
In paragraph 82 of our Secret despatch No. 175 (External), dated the
21st September 1899, we promised a further communication on the subject of
the appointment of a British officer at Bunder Abbas. We understand that
Major Sykes, Her Majesty’s Consul at Kerman, is about to he transferred to
Tehran. The probability of his transfer and facts which have been recently
brought to light regarding the traffic inarms between Maskat and Bunder Abbas
have rendered it additionally important that our interests should be suitably
represen f ed at the latter port. We have therefore, as a provisional arrangement,
deputed to Bunder Abbas Lieutenant V. deV. Hunt, a junior officer of our
Political Department; he will be under the orders of the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf, and will probably spend the hot months of the year, during