‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي." [ظ‎‎٣‎٩] (٣٨٦/٨٣)

65
ti-oul le than the customs difficulty. The Sheikh had long stood m fear of A„
over whose actions he had little or no control, and as early as 1897 he had
Dressed stro n "ly for the recognition by the Government of India of his own
son Hamad as his lawful heir and successor. In 1899 it had been deeded to
recognise the claims of Hamad, hut announcement of the decision was with-
helduntil 1901 inconsequence of the Sheikh’s attitude in the customs question ;
when it was at length communicated to Sheikh Isa he shed tears of gratitude,
hut this was the only return which he ever made for a favour wuhout precedent
in the history of British relations with the 1 ersian Gult. In 18 J.) the quail el
between Ali and his uncle, which related partly to property and partly to
political matters, had been adjusted by a family council ; but at the beginning
of 1901 the formal recognition of Hamad having meanwhile taken place, it
broke out afresh and the town of Manamah became the scene of numerous
excesses committed by a gang of ruffians whom Alt had collected round him.
In September 1904 some of All’s followers assaulted a German merchant at
Manamah, and in the month of November following they stirred up an anti-
Shiah riot in which several inollensive Persians were brutally beaten. In
December Major Cox, the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, visited Bahrein
and secured a satisfactory settlement of the German merchant s case, the
ringleaders being flogged and a sum of Rs. 1,000 paid as compensation ; but
in the Persian case the Sheikh was impractioablo, insisting that it should be
tried by the Shara courts of the islands in which there was no hope ot justice tor
Shiahs against Sunnis. After consultation between the Government of India
and His Maiesty’s Government an ultimatum, backed by naval force, was
eventually presented to tbe Sbeikli on the 25tb of February 1905 , it required
the banishment of Ali for five years, tbe expulsion of the ringleaders m both
cases from Bahrein, tlie payment of compensation to tbe injured Persians, and
the maintenance of efficient bazaar guard in the town of Manamah. On tbe
following day the Sheikh submitted and complied with the terms of the ultima
tum except those relating to Ali and his associates ; Ali spropeity was attached,
hut Ali himself and the other ringleaders evaded arrest and succeeded in
escaping to El Katr. In August, however, Ali surrendered himself and was
deported to India for a period of five years ; some of the other outlaws who
accompanied him w’ere sent for six months to an Indian jail. The terms of the
ultimatum as delivered were generally in accordance with the recommendations
of the Government of India ; but whereas Lord Curzon had suggested that, in
event of forcible measures becoming necessary, the Customs House should be
seized and only be restored wdth a British official in charge, His Majesty’s
Government considered that the connection between the customs difficulty and
the lawlessness of Ali was too remote to warrant the adoption of such a measure.
T he direct results of the crisis were satisfactory, hut still there was no
improvement in the Sheikh’s general attitude; he continued to resist the pro-
2 )Osed reform of his customs administration, and the internal government of the
islands w as highly unsatisfactory and was characterised by gross oppression^ of
the indigenous Baharineh. In 1901, in connection with the growth of foreign
interests in Bahrein, Lord Curzon had indicated that it w as advisable that
steps should be taken at an early date to place the British position in Bahrein
upon a more assured and definite footing, and after the crisis of 1905 he con
sidered that a clear decision was required regarding the nature, and limits
of the British protectorate, so far as it had yet been developed. His Majesty’s
Government, however, held that the time for defining in strict terms the posi
tion of the Sheikh of Bahrein towards the protecting British power had not
yet arrived; hut they concurred in Lord Curzon’s further suggestions and
requested that the political authorities in the Persian Gulf should he instructed
to act “ by steadily, and as far as possible unobtrusively, increasing their in
fluence and the confidence of the Sheikh in their advice and power to direct
and control his external affairs/* The preposterous claims which both Turkey
and Persia entertain to sovereignty over Bahrein were resisted in a suitable
manner during Lord Curzon’s viceroyalty : in 1905 Turkey w r as reminded that
the islands w r ere under British protection, discussion of recent incidents in
Bahrein being at the same time refused; and in 1904 negotiations for the