‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي." [و‎‎٦‎٥] (٣٨٦/١٣٤)

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the Government of India reserved their matured opinion until the situation
should be more advanced.
25. Finally it was arranged, in consultation between His Majesty’s Govern
ment and the Government of India, that the latter should lend a sum not exceed
ing £509,000 at 4 per cent, to the Imperial Bank of Persia—the avowed lender
to the Persian Government—His Majesty’s Government and the Government
of India accepting joint responsibility for the principal and interest of the
loan. The Government of India throughout laid stress, that the security for
the loan was to be the southern customs. On April 4th, 1903, an agreement
was signed in Tehran by the representatives of the Shah and the Imperial Bank
of Persia, of which the substance was that the Bank made an advance of
£200,000 to the Persian Government which the latter engaged to repay in
twenty years, out of the royalties on the Caspian fisheries. It was agreed that
if the revenue from the Caspian fisheries should be insufficient to secure
regular repayments of the advance, the Persian Government engaged itself to
pay amounts requisite for that purpose out of the revenues of the posts and
telegraphs, and in case these were insufficient, out of the revenues of the
“ Customs of Pars and of the Persian Gulf.” Although the Russian Legation
strongly remonstrated with the xlmiu-es-Sultan in private, it did not venture to
protest officially against this violation of the spirit, if not of the letter, of the
earlier Loan Agreements, and thus involve itself in a diplomatic controversy with
the British Government. The sum actually advanced was small, but the political
and moral effects were very great. The Russian loan monopoly, with its far-
reaching effects on the Shah’s independence, had been publicly overthrown. The
British Government at the same time, let it be understood, that a further sum
up to £500,009, the total amount to be lent, would be placed by it (also
through the Imperial Bank as nominal lender), at the disposal of the Persian
Government on conditions to be discussed later on, and that a contribution in
the nature of a subsidy might be forthcoming in return for an undertaking
by the Shah to grant no roads, railways, or other concessions, whether political
or commercial, to foreigners other than English, within an area including
Seistan and the southern provinces of Persia.
26. The “ Customs of Pars and the Persian Gulf ” is on the face of it an ex
pression which admits of a much narrower construction than the one “ Southern
Customs ” which the Government of India had stipulated for in discussing the
security for the loan, and His Excellency Lord Curzon lost no time in raising the
point. On 27th April 1903, he telegraphed to the Secretary of State for India that
in view of the creation of a fresh Customs administration lor the ports of Arabis-
tan and Mohammerah, under the Sheikh of the latter place, the Government of
India considered it desirable that the Persian Government should clearly
understand that these customs, whether collected at Mohammerah or further
inland, were regarded as an integral part of the Gult customs as formerly,
and included in the security for the loan. It was also asked what was the
exact interpretation to be placed in other respects on the expression I ars
and the Persian Gulf,” which the Government of India presumed included all
ports from Gwetter to the Shatt-el-Arab, which were ports of Southern Persia,
and, as such, covered by the Shah’s pledge of 23rd October 1897.
27. Sir A. Hardinge deprecated raising this point in relation to the late
advance, which in theory was a non-political one, by the Bank, and proposed
to defer any discussion of it, till it could be treated in connection with the
registry of the Rfcglement Douanier under the Commercial Convention of 9th
February 1903. This situation the Government of India regarded as extremely
unsatisfactory, pointing out that they had never been prepared to make the loan
for no return and had throughout pressed for the Southern Customs as the first
security. His Majesty’s Government concurred in the view that no further
advance should be made to Persia except under conditions which would dis
tinctly strengthen our hold upon the Southern Customs, and as the Persian
ernment maintained their position that the expression Fais and the Hul of
Ears ” was the only one which their engagements with Russia allowed them
formally to employ, the Grand Vizier decided to withdraw his request foi the
£100,000 to complete the loan (£200,000 only had been actually drawn by