‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي." [ظ‎‎١‎٢‎٣] (٣٨٦/٢٥١)

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Mushir-ed-Dowleli’s note was considered unfriendly, becnnse he had wished
simply to give an assurance that whatever change might be made in the
administration of Seistan, it would have no political signiticance, or affect the
friendship between the two Governments,
52. In December 1903 the Persian Government decided to summon to
Tehran the Governors of Provinces in order to discuss the possibility of introducing
a new system of taxation, and the Hashmat-ul-Mulk was among those invited to
attend. * After exhausting every argument to excuse himself from obeying the
summons, the Hashmat finally left Seistan for the capital on 10th March
1904, reaching it in July, his son, Mir Masum Khan, formally taking over the
duties of Deputy Governor.
53. On his arrival in Tehran he was detained there on various pretexts by
the Persian Government practically as a political detenu. The Persian Govern*
ment, without removing him, took away all his power by placing foreign affairs
in Seistan under the Karguzar and frontier affairs under a Sarhaddar, at that
time the Yamin-i-Nizam, and also by sending the Mustansir-ul-Mulk to enquire
about the revenue.
54. Humours also filled the air while the Hashmat was at Tehran that his
deposition had been determined on, and His Majesty’s Government throughout
the various proposals and counter-proposals of the Persian Government took up a
strong position warning them against any step calculated to disturb the status quo
which might compel His Majesty’s Government to alter fundamentally their policy
as to Seistan and adjoining regions. It was hinted that it might be impossible if the
Hashmat were removed to withdraw the boundary mission from Seistan.
The Government of India, on being consulted, fully endorsed this attitude in a
telegram, dated the 28th October 1904, and further pointed out that the position
taken upby the Persian Government was most unsatisfactory, as evidenced by their
action as to quarantine arrangements in the Gulf, at Hen jam, in the matterof the
Bunder Abbas and Seistan Telegraphs, the establishment of a Customs post at
Godar-i-Balutak, the introduction of fresh Russian signallers at Meshed and the
proposal regarding the withdrawal of consular guards. It was suggested that
in the event of Persia continuing in her anti-British policy in Seistan the
question of securing control of the Helmand might have to assume a more
prominent position in our negotiations with the Amir than the Government
of India were at the time disposed to give it, and that an intimation might
also with advantage be conveyed to the Persian Government that the
British Government would not in the future be disposed, as hitherto, actively
to exercise on behalf of the Central Government their influence with the
maritime and frontier Chiefs over whom the Persian Government had
found it diificult to maintain their direct control. In other ways too British
support was given to the Hashmat. His Majesty's Legation were authorised
to guarantee loans—the Government of India being a joint guarantor—by
tlic Impci ml Bank of I cisia to enable him to discharge claims made upon him by
the Central Government. The Persian Government, however, hesitated to decide
the matter regarding theHashmat and meanwhile both Mr. GrantDuff and Colonel
McMahon expressed the opinion that the Hashmat was politically of little
use to us and not a worthy object of solicitude. Such being the case and in
view of the deadlock reached in his case, the Government of India suggested
to the Secretary of State on the 3rd January 1905, that the situation might be
relieved, and an arrangement about Seistan affairs generally might be effected
w ith the Persian Government if objection were withdrawn to the removal
of the Hashmat-ul-Mulk on condition that he w r as suitably provided elsewhere.
It was pointed out that but for the Russian attitude about him which was a
consequence of his action in the riots of 1903, in all probability the Govern
ment ol India would not have committed themselves so strongly to his sup-
port. Another proposed condition of the arrangement should be' the recall of
the 1 amin-i-Nizam on the withdrawal ol the Seistan Mission and the appoint
ment and retention there of a strong and approved Governor. If all these
objects could he attained at once the Government of India would a^ree to
withdraw Colonel McMahon s Mission at a very early date—a step which would
atioid the lersian Government an opportunity of acting in accordance with the