‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي." [ظ‎‎٤‎٣] (٣٨٦/٩١)

73
to him except his own hereditary dominions. A short interval in the hostilities
followed durinse which Abdul Aziz visited Koweit and there met, accidentally,
w h tlie Russian Consul-General from Bushire who seems to have offered l„m
assistance in arms and money. In April 1903 Ibn itaskid made an attack upon
Kiadh, but was repulsed. -mm i t
The position of Ibn Rashid was now serious, and in January 1901 he for
the th id time sought help of the Turks who were at last disposed to afford
m arrive assistance. In February 1904 the British Ambassador at Constanti
nople was instructed to claim fulfilment of a pledge given by the lurks m
October 1901, that they would restrain the Amir oi Jaoal bhammar if the
British Government restrained the Sheikh of Koweit. In April Lord Curzon
su<rnested that the Turks should be warned against interfering directly in the
affairs of Nejd, as otherwise it might he necessary for he British Government
to take measures in those regions for the protection of their own interests On
news being received that Turkish troops had been ordered to proceed from
Medina to Central Arabia, a fresh remonstrance was made at Constantinople,
hut the British Ambassador felt that the aggressiveness of Ibn Sand wakened
the British arguments and he doubted whether the reconstitution of the Wahabi
power in Central Arabia would he in every respect an advantage. Lord
Ampthill, at this time acting Viceroy of India, was, however, clear in his
opinion that Turkish interference in Central Arabia should, if possible, be
prevented; at the end of May 1904-he pointed out that the power of the
Wahabis was now territorial, not fanatical ; that British prestige would suffer
at Koweit if the Sheikh were restrained trom assisting his ally ; and that the
absorption of Neid by the Turks might be a greater evil than a V ahabi domina-
tion and mhdit lead to encroachments on Koweit from an unexpected direction
in which the boundaries of the principality were undefined. Further remons
trances at Constantinople were accordingly authorised, but they were inettec*
tual, and the only practical outcome of the discussion between the Government
of India and His Maiesty’s Government was the appointment, a month or two
later, of a British Political Agent to Koweit.
Meanwhile events had not stood still in Central Arabia. In March 1901 the
Shammar Governor of Kasim was defeated and slain by Abdul Aziz, and in
April the Wahabis occupied Anaiza, the chief town of Kasim. In May
the Turkish expeditionary force, consisting of 2,000 infantry and a battery of
artillery, marched from Samawali on the Puphratesj Ibn S tud, alarmed at
the prospect of Turkish intervention, wrote to the British Political Besident in
the Persian Gulf requesting British protection, but again no answer was
returned to his letter. In July the Turkish expedition, having entered Kasim,
was attacked by Ibn Sand’s followers and the general population of the district,
and the Turks, though they were accompanied by Ihn Rashid and his men,
suffered a severe defeat, losing their commandant and numerous officers, after
which they remained for two months immured in a village near the scene of the
encounter. In September, having attempted to resume the offensive^ they met
with a fresh reverse, and the remnant of the force, numbering about 700 men,
retired into Jahal Shammar territory.
This was the end of another phase in the struggle. At the beginning of
1904 the Government of India had been led lo consider the advisability of
despatching: a British officer to Riadh for the purpose of studying the situation
and possibly of entering into closer relations with Ibn Saud; enquiry showed
that such a mission could easily he arranged through the Sheikh of Koweit.
His Majesty’s Government, however, in the state of affairs then prevailing,
regarded the proposal with some apprehension, and directed that without their
previous sanction no steps should be taken to enter into closer relations with
Nejd or to send agents there. Eventually the Government of India informed
His Majesty’s Government that, while recognising that it might shortly become
incumbent on them to take a closer interest in the affairs of Central Arabia,
they did not propose to move immediately in the matter. To this conclusion
His Majesty's Government readily assented, but they admitted the desirability
of obtaining further information about Nejd, and they did not discountenance
the idea of the subject being re-opened at a future and more suitable opportu
nity.