‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي." [و‎‎٩‎٨] (٣٨٦/٢٠٠)

91
oi' could possibly prevent or postpone hopes which the trade route itself had
been called into existence to realise, and which, without it, would have had no
bein". Either the Nushki Seistan trade route was a bond jide enterprise, upon
which we had designedly embarked, in the main because of its commercial
possibilities,.but also not without an eye to the extreme political importance
of Seistan ; or it was a fortuitous and foolish experiment, not likely or intended
to succeed. In the latter case we should be wise to drop it, in the former we
should be honest and make the best job of it we could.
13. Lord Curzon had no hesitation in urging a strenuous continuation of the
venture, with an eye, not to an early or brilliant success of the trade route, but
to a two-fold contingency, political and commercial, in the future. In the first
place if we did not continue to show an active interest m Seistan, Kussia would:
if we 5 did not give the impression there of preponderant influence, Kussian
authority would soon supplant ours. If either by plague cordons or otherwise
the Nushki-Seistan traffic were killed, there would only remain the single
access of the Bunder Abbas road for Indian trade to Khorasan ; and this it
would be easy for our rivals to close by similar tactics. If we did not desire
Kussia to advance to the Persian Gulf, the obvious method was to block the
most direct of her paths. Looking to the future of Northern Khorasan, which
was inevitably destined to pass under Russiancontrol, it should be our object to
draw the line of demarcation between the Russian and the British spheres at the
point best suited to our interests, and not to hers. . TurbaU-Haidari would
doubtless follow the fortunes of Meshed, the semi-independent chief ship of
Kain might very well he retained as a buffer, Seistan should, for all the reasons
given, be included in the British sphere of interest. It was no exaggeration to
say we could not afford to see it excluded.
14, Secondlv, the future of Soistan would depend upon the proper employ
ment of the immense water-supply from the Helmand which,
system of miration, might raise the present population of about 60,000 to a
million or more. It, was clear, therefore, that the future of Seistan would
lie with those who controlled the upper course of the Ilelmand, and as the
day would undoubtedly come—which no wisdom in the world could greatly
- retard—when in response to an external challenge Great Britain would le
obliged to advance to Kandahar, and, with it, would occupy the valley of the
Hoi man d, it would be well that Seistan should he waiting to be regenerated
by us, instead of having been already absorbed by others.
15 Bor these reasons, Lord Curzon recommended that, in the intervening
years 1 the Government of India should continue, by constant hut unpreten
tious activity, in fostering the trade route, in providing for its security, and
in reducin'' its discomforts, and by a steady assertion of British authority up
to the borders of Seistan and of British influence witliin it, to build up an
interest in Seistan which should save for India an area and a market of so
much potential value. With this object the Government of India should
he willin'' to spend a few thousand pounds upon a venture that would he
defensible" even if it were doomed to failure, but that appeared on the con
trary to be attended with reasonable hopes of success.
16 The Alinute then went on to consider the question of a possible railway
connection between India and Soistan. The first idea of some such railway
originated with the late Sir J. Browne, in 1884, who put it fornard, without
any reference to Persia, for strategical reasons ; name y in order to prevent
otnnv future period, a Russian advance upon Kandahar In 188J, tlie su„
gestion was taken up by Sir It D. Wolff, who advocated it for two reasons :
fs a menace to the Trans-Caspian Railway of Kussia, and as the saving of a
longTand march, in the event of our desiring to take ^ f ^ ^
that Power This line of argument was controverted by General Brackenbury,
It tlrntTme he^ of the Intelligence Department at '-me who cimclui d
bv savin"-—“By far the more important task is, not the const,ructi
of a new line ‘into Seistan, hut the consolidation of our power there by
hiini'int'the frontier tribes under our intluenoe, and by developm B 1
chistan and converting it into a fertile base of operations. \\ hen this has
hren done it will be time to push forward into Persia.” The scheme was, there
fore! dropped. It is thus clear that the idea of a Scistan railway does not