‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي." [و‎‎١‎١] (٣٨٦/٢٦)

9
a similar concession should be granted to an English company in the
South ; and that no Southern Kail way concession should be allowed to any
foreign company without consultation with Her Majesty’s Government.
On the Gtli July 1900, Lord George Hamilton replied to the Government
of India. With reference to the suggested pariition of Persia into spheres of
influence, 11 is Lordship explained that any overtures on the subject to the
Kussian Government would probably be misrepresented to the Shah as indicat
ing a desire on the part of Great Britain
Opinion of His Majesty’s Governmeafc. to % ffect an i mmed \ ate partition of his
dominions ; and that His Majesty’s Government were not disposed for the time
being to make any proposals on the subject. They preferred rather to rest
content with the announcements to the Persian Government above recited.
A year later, on the 9th July 1901, Lord Lansdowne instructed Sir Arthur
Hardinge to take an early opportunity of speaking to the Atabeg-i-Azam on
the subject of Seistan, of explaining the interest which His Majesty’s Gov
ernment had in this quarter, and the advantage to the Persian Government of
upholding its own administrative control, and thus saving the British Govern
ment from the need of special measures for the protection of their peculiar
interests.
In the meanwhile the Russian Government had steadily pursued their
forward course. In January 1900, a loan of 22,500,000 roubles had been made
to the Shah on the security of the Persian Customs, save those of Ears and the
Persian Gulf. Negotiations had taken place for a further loan and for a new
commercial treaty, designed to secure the detriment of British trade and the
furtherance of that of Russia ; the construction of a Russian railway from
Ashkabad to Meshed appeared imminent; Russian representatives had
displayed renewed activity at Nasratabad and in the regions contiguous to the
Further Ttussian activity. Insistence Baluch border; Russian influence had
by Lord Curzon. placed fresh obstacles in the way of
British trade passing by the Nushki route; Russian Consular Agents and a
State-aided merchant service had appeared in the Persian Gulf. Again,
therefore, Lord Curzon found it necessary to review the situation at length,
and to urge His Majesty’s Government to insist on the maintenance of British
influence in Southern Persia, and the exclusion of Russia from the acquisition
of political rights or interests in that quarter. The result of the presence'of
a Russian fortified base in Southern Persia was discussed at length, and it was
urged that, while no objection need be taken to the acquisition of reasonable
outlets for legitimate trade, on no account should Russia be suflered to
obtain a fortified base either on the Indian Ocean or in the Persian Gulf itself.
Lord Curzon’s Minute was forwarded to the Secretary of State for India with
a despatch, dated the 7th November 1901. Insistence began to bear fruit. On the
6th January following, Sir Arthur Hardinge was addressed by Lord Lansdowne
in an important communication, which expounded the views of His Majesty’s
^ Government in clear terms. The
Pronouncement to Persian Government. wag instructed to explain to
the Shah’s Government that Great Britain could not reasonably be expected
to abandon a position obtained by many years of sustained effort, or to
acquiesce in attempts on the part of other Powers to acquire political
predominance in Southern Persia; that Great Britain could not consent to
the acquisition by Russia of a military or naval station in the Persian Gulf ;
and that, if at any time the Persian Government should make such a concession
to Prussia, it would be necessary for His Majesty’s Government to take in the
Gulf such measures as they might consider necessary for the protection of
British interests. His Majesty’s Government, moreover, could not acquiesce in
the concession to Russia of any preferential political rights or advantages or of
any commercial monopoly or exclusive privilege in the southern or south
eastern districts of Persia, including Seistan. finally, it was to be clearly
intimated that if, in the face of our warnings, the Persian Government should
elect to encourage the advance of Russian political influence and intervention
in those regions, His Majesty’s Government would necessarily have to
reconsider their policy, which had consistently aimed at maintaining the