‏"ملخص الأحداث والتدابير الرئيسية التي اتخذها سمو نائب الملك اللورد كرزون من كيدلستون، نائب الملك والحاكم العام للهند في إدارة الخارجية. ‏I‏. يناير ١٨٩٩-أبريل ١٩٠٤. ‏II‏. ديسمبر ١٩٠٤-نوفمبر ١٩٠٥. المجلد IV. بلاد فارس والخليج الفارسي." [و‎‎١‎٤‎٠] (٣٨٦/٢٨٤)

(ii) The continuation of the existing arrangements by which Imperial
and police duties would be carried out by the ships of the lloyal
Navy, assisted from time to time by particular hoyal Indian
Marine vessels armed for special duties. The command of all
armed vessels Would in these circumstances remain with the Naval
Commander-in-Chief in peace and war.
9. The scheme suggested by the Admiralty may be credited with the
following advantages:—the administrative convenience resulting from the more
direct control of a naval force in Indian waters; the eventual formation of a
body of officers who would be intimately acquainted with the inhabitants and
languages of the littoral, and with local conditions j and the improvement of
the status of the Royal Indian Marine in consequence of the prestige attaching
to a combatant service. It is, further, possible that a few officers and men of
the Royal Navy might be released from local employment for more important
duties with battle squadrons.
But, as we shall endeavour to show in detail, the serious political, financial
and administrative disadvantages which the proposed measure possesses are in
our opinion, sucli as to preclude its acceptance.
10. Even if we regard the Admiralty proposal from the point of view of our
political interests in the 1. ersian Gulf alone, the scheme must in our opinion
stand condemned, because of the serious reduction of our prestige that could not
fail to result. So long as the Gulf was practically an Indian lake, and‘the duty
of our ships was confined to the coercion of the oriental inhabitants of the
Persian and Arabian coasts, our interests could safely be entrusted to the ships
of the Indian Navy. The advent of French men-of-war in greater numbers,
and the placing of the slave trade under the Frencliand Spanish flag, were the
chief causes of the substitution of the Imperial Navy for the local service in
186*2. Now that not only France but Russia, Germany, and Turkey are display
ing an increasing interest in the Persian Gulf, and that the influence of Great
Britain is being directly and increasingly challenged by other nations whose
policy and ambitions can he open to no misinterpretation, it is essential that we
should he strongly represented by ships possessing the high prestige of His
Majesty’s Navy in waters which possess an Imperial importance in connection
with the Middle Eastern problem. It would he disastrous to revert to our
former system of control in these seas, for no act of legislation could confer on
the Koval Indian Marine the same international status as is enjoyed by the
Koval Navy. This objection would apply with even greater force to any
proposal for the utilisation of an armed squadron of the Royal Indian Marine
in more frequented Eastern Waters.
Again with the Royal Nauy as our naval agency, we can count upon a
superior type of officer to that which we should secure under an expanded
Royal Indian Marine. r Ihe absence of local knowledge or experience has not
been attended by any of the results that sometimes occur in countries, where
Europeans are brought into contact for the first time with oriental peoples or
customs. On the contrary, the naval officers, who have been called upon to
perform vhat are sometimes very delicate duties', appear to have displayed a
uniform and remarkable mixture of firmness and tact. It will be remembered
that in connection with the arming of the L'norence your predecessor expressed
•some doubt regarding the capacity of Royal Indian Marine officers, even when
serving under the immedia e command of officers of His Majesty’s Navy, to
deal satisfactorily with international questions.
11. Secondly, the resuscitation of an Indian Navy, in however modified a
form, would entail additional expenditure from our revenues, which would not
only he considerable in the initial stages, but would also tend to increase.
We have not attempted to es‘imate the extra cost of a local service. It is
perhaps sufficient to recall the fact that whereas, previous to its abolition, more
than £300,000 was spent yearly on the Indian Navy, our present contribution
to the Admiralty amounts to less than £120,OlO. It is, however, patent that,
in our circumstances, a local navy, of whatever size, must he by far the more
expensive arrangement. The Admiralty are able to provide the ships and materiel
required for local duties more cheaply than vve are in a position to do, and are
.able to dis2)ose of them to better advantage when their period of utility has