"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [و‎‎٤‎٧] (٥٤٠/٩٨)

67
SITUATION ON THE JABAL HAMRIN
Euphrates, it was felt, taking everything into consideration,
that a serious enemy offensive in Mesopotamia was not imminent.
On the other hand there were several indications that the
enemy meant to take advantage of the Russian inactivity to
send small parties into Persia.
ex treme British right, British detachments occupied
Mandah and Balad Ruz, while the 14th Division held a line
which extended from the neighbourhood of Shahraban to and
along the left bank of the Diyala as far south as Windiya
westward of which the 13th Division held a, line to a point
j us t north of Sindiya.* Opposite the British
IUrd Corps was the Turkish XIII Corps holding a very
extended line m no great strength, with its advanced troops
along the western slopes of the Jabal Hamrin. In the area
Qizil Ribat-Jabal Hamrin, east of the Diyala, it was estimated
that the Turks had about 540 sabres, 1,100 rifles, and 12 guns
with a further 60 sabres about Khaniqin ; while between
Kifri and the Diyala, and including an advanced detach
ment at Delli Abbas, their total strength was reckoned as
about 50 sabres, 3,200 rifles and 28 guns.
When the Russians withdrew from the Diyala General
Maude would have liked to occupy the Jabal Hamrin, both
to render his right flank more secure and to deny to the Turks
this screen for movements against his flank and into Persia.
But transportation difficulties and the great heat stood in
the way. A further reason for its occupation was that from it
the Turks were able to interfere seriously with the supply of
water for irrigating the land along the Diyala. But it was not
till the beginning of October, when the weather was cooler, the
light railway running to Shahraban, the conversion to metre-
gauge of the section from Baghdad to Baquba nearing
completion and the Turco-German offensive hanging fire,
that General Maude felt in a position to carry out this project.
On the 7th October he discussed the outline of the necessary
operations with General Marshall, to whom he sent orders
next day that the Illrd Corps, with certain cavalry and army
troops attached, was to occupy the Jabal Hamrin on the
Diyala left bank so as to control the mouths of the various
canals fed by the Diyala downstream of Abu Zenabil. At
the same time General Marshall was asked to submit to General
Headquarteis the broad details of his plan, for which the
preliminary movements should be commenced so as to enable
the column on the Diyala right bank to begin to make its
presence felt by the enemy by the 17th October.
* See Map 35.