"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [و‎‎١‎٢‎٠] (٥٤٠/٢٤٤)

DUNSTERVILLE’S VIEWS
191
ihe Turks seemed to be operating in three directions
namely against Baku, south of Tabriz and against the Jelus!
General Dunsterville’s information was that they intended
to take Baku first; and to hamper their advance' we should
place a containing force before Tabriz and concentrate on
assisting the Jelus. If General Dunsterville received a complete
cavalry regiment and a mountain battery he considered that
\uth an infantry and a field artillery brigade he would have
sufficient troops, if they arrived before any radical change in
the situation took place. He could not emphasise too strongly
the necessity of hastening the despatch of this force in view of
the precarious situation at Baku, Urmia and Tabriz and the
possibility of rapid development in any or all of these places
and of the lateness of the season.
General Marshall added that his arrangements for collecting
transport were nearly completed. His infantry, whose leading
unit would reach railhead that night, would be despatched
first by motor transport, half a battalion at a time, and the
guns and first and second line transport would follow by route
march. The 8 th Field Battery had reached Harunabad and two
squadrons 14th Hussars were due at Hamadan next day. He
had made arrangements to send ammunition to the Jelus.
The views of the general situation held at this period by the
General Staff in India and the War Office are shown by the
following summary of telegraphic correspondence which took
place between the 4th and the 12 th July. Telegraphing on
the 4th, the Commander-in-Chief in India offered the following
opinions based on such information as was at his disposal ;
and he asked for the comments of the Chief of the Imperial
General Staff. India s increasing importance as a source of
supplies and man-power seemed to offer a military objective
which Germany might consider worth her serious attention.
For she was aware that, if the anti-British war party in
Afghanistan got the upper hand, the resultant disorder on
the Indian frontier would encourage insecurity in India and
cause a diminution of output of men and supplies ; and as
Germany desired commercial control of Central Asian markets
up to the Indian border, she might be prepared to take consider
able risks to make the Afghan and Persian frontiers her objec-
tive. For this, large German forces would not be necessary, as
a Turkish expedition under German leadership might create
the required disturbance.
No further development appeared probable on the Salonika
front. We seemed likely to remain on the defensive in Palestine.