"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [و‎‎١‎٠‎٥] (٥٤٠/٢١٤)

GENERAL MARSHALL’S VIEWS
167
In regard to the Euphrates line, the War Office considered
it advisable to reduce Hit to an outpost, supported by Ramadi;
and that, if the railway was extended to Tikrit, the shortage of
railway material necessitated discontinuance of the extension
to Ramadi.
On the 12th May General Marshall replied. His operations
in South Kurdistan had driven the demoralised remnants of
the Turkish 2nd Division across the Little Zab beyond his
powers of pursuit, but had only caused the diversion of one
infantry battalion from the other division ( 6 th) in the XIII
Corps to oppose his advance.* To keep up the maximum
pressure on enemy forces within reach, his only objective was
the Turkish XVIII Corps ; and an extension of the railway to
Tikrit would bring him within thirty and fifty miles, respectively,
of the XVIII Corps positions at and above Fat-ha. Though
he had no doubt that he could capture these positions, he was
equally certain that the Turks there would retire rather than
offer serious opposition ; and to maintain the large pursuing
force necessary to keep up pressure on the enemy it would
be necessary to extend the railway beyond Tikrit. This
would enable him to maintain both his 1st Corps on the Tigris
and his Illrd Corps on the Kirkuk-Erbil line.
In General Marshall’s opinion, such operations would result
in the capture of Mosul and the disappearance of Turkish
control of country between the Tigris and the Persian border.
But his railhead would then be much closer to the enemy
railhead at Nisibin and his force could have no effect on the
Turks in the Caucasus, who could be supplied there and at
Tabriz from the Black Sea.
To extend the railway to Tikrit would take two months
and another two months to Shuraimiya, beyond which no
estimate was possible as the line would have to cross the
Jabal Hamrin. Moreover, owing to the intense heat of the
next four months, General Marshall urged most strongly that
no operations should commence before the 15th September.
As regards General Dunsterville’s force, General Marshall
could only supply at Hamadan from about June to December
* The 6th Division at this time was believed to consist of the 16th, 18th
and 22nd Regiments. Two battalions of the 22nd were near Mosul, but
the 3/16th and all three battalions of the 18th Regiment moved westward,
from Ruwandiz and the Penjwin-Halebja area respectively, to Altun Kopri
at the beginning of May. The Turkish force, believed to belong to the 6th
Division, which was reported moving towards Urmia, was understood to be
2,500 rifles strong, including the 2/16th and l/22nd Regiments, with some
frontier formations.