"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [ظ‎‎٣‎٠] (٥٤٠/٦٥)

36 HISTORY OF THE WARMESOPOTAMIA
two divisions available to reinforce either corps, to hold the
Divala or Euphrates line or to act as a general reserve^ To
form this division he would require the following additmnal
troops ■ three British infantry battalions two field artillery
brigades (each of three 6-gun 18-pounder and two 4-gun
4 . 5 -inch howitzer batteries), three small-arms ammunition
sections, one horsed cable and one motor airline section, three
brigade machine gun companies, one veterinary sectmn and
one sanitary section. “ In conclusion, he said I should like
to make it clear that, as regards immediate future I am quite
satisfied with my position and that I am merely looking well
ahead in view of possible developments.”
Both the Commander-in-Chief in India and the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff agreed as to the necessity for t e
formation of another division, to be numbered the 17th, and
steps were at once taken to provide the additional units required.
There was considerable further correspondence in August
and September regarding Russian co-operation. General
Korniloff, who succeeded General Brusiloff in chief command
of all the Russian armies on the 1st August, sent imperative
orders for a Russian force under General Vadbolski to unclertake
an offensive towards Mosul via Ruwandiz and for General
Baratoff’s force to re-occupy the Diyala line, where he was to
come under General Maude’s orders and be supplied by him.
Owing to the chaotic state of affairs in Russia and General
Korniloff’s pre-occupation, the Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, however, considered it doubtful if Russian General
Headquarters could make reliable arrangements for operations
on the Persian front, and he instructed General Maude to
arrange for any possible co-operation direct with General
Baratoff. He himself would continue to press for Russian
co-operation, though he had little hope of getting it. Any
assistance that we could obtain, therefore, would be so much
to the good unless General Maude had to take undue risks in
return. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff also said that
it was improbable that the Russians would attempt anything
on their main Caucasus front. Owing to this last opinion, which
was confirmed by other information received by him, General
Maude telegraphed on the 17th August that any offensive
action by him up the Tigris must be restricted, though he
hoped that opportunities might still occur for a limited offensive,
thus obviating the relegation of his force to a passive attitude,
which would give the enemy his best opportunity and at the
same time damp the fighting spirit of his own men.