"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [و‎‎١‎٤‎٣] (٥٤٠/٢٩٠)

EVACUATION ORDERED
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withheld* the fourth battahon of the 39th Brigade and the
2nd Field Battery, both of which General Dunsterville had
asked should be sent to Baku.f General Dunsterville had been
ordered to evacuate that place at once and had been told that
no more reinforcements would be sent him. His troops were
to be withdrawn to Enzeli, but he might increase the garrison
of Krasnovodsk up to a battahon and a battery. This latter
order was modified next day by instructions that he was to be
guided in calculating the size of the force at Krasnovodsk, for
the defence of which he would be responsible, by the probability
that the force would have to depend for supphes on North-West
Persia and by the numbers of ships at his disposal. To obtain
ships was, he was told, of the utmost importance.
In the meantime, the Trans-Caspian force Opposing the
advance of the Bolsheviks from Merv had been reinforced in
their position at Kaakha by about 500 rifles of the 19th Punjabis,
sent by General Malleson from Meshed. On the 28th August
a Bolshevik attack in force was beaten back with heavy loss.
In this action most of the local troops fled, leaving the Punjabis
to bear the brunt of the fighting ; and the gallant conduct of
the latter combined with the pusillanimity displayed by many of
the Bolshevik force, mainly contributed to the successful
result. Next day a company of the l/4th Hampshire, which
had recently reached Krasnovodsk from Enzeli, joined the
force at Kaakha ; and a section of the 44th Field Battery,
which reached Krasnovodsk from Enzeli on the 2nd September,
reached Kaakha on the 4th.
On the 1st September General Dunsterville telegraphed to
Baghdad that he was doubtful if it would be possible to save
Baku. This telegram, which was delayed in transit and was
repeated to the War Office by General Marshall on the 4th,
crossed the telegram from the latter ordering evacuation.
General Dunsterville said that the delay in arrival at Baku of
British reinforcements had given the enemy the initiative and
that our troops had been forced back to the last line of defence.
* In point of fact the order had been sent before General Marshall arrived
back, but he confirmed it.
f On the 3rd September the Commander-in-Chief in India telegraphed to the
War Office offering the opinion that the Turkish force at Sauj Bulag was
primarily a flank guard, which, as it could be met by reinforcements to
Kermanshah and Hamadan from railhead, hardly seemed to justify the with
holding of reinforcements from Baku. Moreover, in General Monro s opinion
the movement of reinforcements towards Enzeli would have been useful
towards meeting an enemy advance from Tabriz.