"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [و‎‎٦] (٥٤٠/١٦)

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PREFACE iii
During the last phase of the campaign, dealt with in the
present volume, our operations in Mesopotamia contributed
only indirectly to the final downfall of the enemy. But the
action we took in Persia and on the Caspian prevented the
Turco-German eastward thrust from reaching a really dangerous
stage. The detachment of large Turkish forces to the Caucasus
at a period when their Syrian and Mesopotamian fronts were in
urgent need of reinforcement is difficult to understand from a
purely military point of view. It can only be explained satis
factorily if it is regarded as an attempt to vindicate their
national ideal by building up a new state which would include
the ancient home of their race.
In 1914, the inner group of Turkish leaders saw in the war,
which they were convinced would be won by Germany, an
opportunity of attaining the fulfilment of their territorial
ambitions ; and it is said that the governing consideration
which secured Turkish support for Germany was her pledge
ensuring Turkey possession of Russian Armenia, North-West
Persia, the Moslem provinces of Caucasia and the Trans-
Caspian region. Neither Egypt nor the Arab provinces of
Turkey—with the possible exception of Mosul and the area
connecting it with North-West Persia—contained a Turkish
population. Indeed, both regions, from geographical, ethnical
and political causes, had in the past proved themselves a heavy
liability and a source of danger and weakness rather than of
strength to the Ottoman Empire. They were therefore of little
value in Pan-Turkish eyes. But, in German eyes, Syria and
Palestine offered the outstanding military advantage of enabling
the Turks to carry out operations against the Suez Canal and
Egypt, and Mesopotamia had always been essential for the
fulfilment of German eastern ambitions. This conflict of aims
was evident throughout the war. It was apparently largely
owing to German influence that the Turks undertook operations
against the Suez Canal; and in 1917, when Enver insisted on
the project for the recapture of Baghdad, he was serving
German interests and at the same time appealing to the Pan-
Turks through the recovery of the control of the main route
into Persia.
By the beginning of 1918 Mustapha Kemal Pasha is said to
have attained such a strong position in the Pan-Turkish party
that he was able to dictate the policy to be followed. The
Brest-Litovsk negotiations were in progress, any Russian
military recovery was improbable, and the Tartar tribes of the
Caucasus offered a great intact military reserve as a suitable