"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [و‎‎٧‎٧] (٥٤٠/١٥٨)

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EUPHRATES OPERATIONS 121
enemy’s attention might be diverted elsewhere and our
forward reserves of ammunition and supplies completed.
But, on the 8 th March, it was reported that the Turks had
vacated their Broad Wadi position and were falling back.
General Brooking’s troops at once advanced and occupied
Hit* and Sahiliya on the 9th and 10th March respectively ;
and the Turks, suffering considerably in their retirement from
the attacks of our aeroplanes, withdrew to Khan Baghdadi,
twenty-two miles above Hit.f General Brooking’s division,
with headquarters at Hit, was then distributed in three
brigade groups, i.e., at Sahiliya, Hit, and at a point about nine
miles below Hit.^ Railhead was at Dhibban and riverhead
was established close to Hit.
As the result of a conference between Generals Marshall
and Brooking at Baghdad on the 11th and 12th March, it was
decided that General Brooking should commence operations
on the 24th. The object of these operations, which might last
for ten to fourteen days, was to drive the enemy as far as
possible from Hit and to inflict as much damage as possible
on him, before withdrawing to occupy a position covering Hit.
Describing his intentions to the Chief of the Imperial General
Staff in a telegram on the 12th March, General Marshall said
that he proposed to occupy Hit till the transport require
ments of the local harvest and of the troops sent to Persia
necessitated withdrawal to nearer railhead. He considered
that to make the occupation of Hit easier the enemy should
be pushed back beyond Khan Baghdadi; and as reports
suggested that, if pressed, he would retire beyond Haditha
and might go as far back as Ana, General Marshall proposed
a limited pursuit. In conclusion, referring to a doubt which
the Chief of the Imperial General Staff had expressed regarding
the advisability of a subsequent withdrawal from Hit,§ General
Marshall said that he did not think that such a withdrawal
would necessarily give the enemy the impression that we
did not intend to advance in force later.
In carrying out the preparations for General Brooking’s
offensive, every precaution was taken to preserve secrecy * * * §
* At Hit they captured a few prisoners, two mountain guns and over 100
shakturs, as well as other stores.
f See Map 37.
I There were also small detachments at posts from Ramadi to Falluja.
§ In the telegram expressing this doubt sent on the 11th March, the Chief
of the Imperial General Staff had approved the occupation of Hit, as our
presence there constituted a threat of further advance and kept the enemy
in uncertainty. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff did not think it
desirable to go farther up the Euphrates.