"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [و‎‎٥‎١] (٥٤٠/١٠٦)

mmmm
ENEMY PLANS
73
being the enemy s main energies were directed towards the
Palestine front. A considerable number of German troops
including probably the 701st, 702nd and 703rd Battalions'
after inspection by the Kaiser at Constantinople at the bemn-
nmg of October, had left for Palestine, where a third and
possibly a fourth, division from the Seventh Army concen
tration at Aleppo had also gone. All reports agreed that all
troop movement towards Mesopotamia had practically ceased
and was proceeding towards Palestine instead. It was also
reported at the same time that the Turks were mobilising
all men up to 52 years of age, irrespective of race and creed,
this would certainly increase the already large number of
desertions from the Turkish army, and the fact that it was
found necessary brought out clearly the straits to which the
enemy was reduced for man-power. It also lessened the
importance of the news that the Aleppo-Hit road would soon
be fit for motor lorries.
The Turks and Germans were still engaged, however in
trying to push forward agents on both General Maude’s flanks
to create trouble in Persia and among the Arabs to the west
of the British lines of communication. It was reported that
German officers intended to utilise a large body of Persian
gendarmerie, whom the Turks had disbanded and were
sending back to Persia,* for anti-British activities there;
and General Maude made arrangements with Baratoff to inter
cept them. The German propaganda amongst the Arabs
showed little signs of success. For instance, the Muntafik
Shaikh Ajaimi, who had always been prepared to sell his
services to the highest bidder, had to our knowledge been
receiving a handsome monthly subsidy from the Germans,
ostensibly for the purpose of raising forces against us. But it
was clear that he had little influence remaining and had been
quite unsuccessful in his recent efforts to raise tribal forces.
Early in October, General Prjevalski, commanding the Russian
Caucasus Armies, intimated that his troops would be unable
to co-operate with General Maude’s force. But, as he wished
to do what he could, he suggested that a force of 15,000
Cossacks should be sent to act under General Maude’s orders.
As it was thought that their moral and efficiency had been less
affected by the events of the Revolution than those of the
Russian infantry, this offer was at first accepted. But it
became doubtful if they could reach Mesopotamia in time to
be of use or if their co-operation, all things considered, would
be of any practical value ; and it was decided that it would
* They had accompanied the Turkish XIII Corps in its retreat from Hamadan
in March, but had been found useless by the Turks.