"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [و‎‎١‎١‎٤] (٥٤٠/٢٣٢)

MARSHALL’S APPRECIATION
This left only two groups from whom any material resistance to
he enemy might be expected, i.e., the ArmeniansTnd Telus
lnn h n™ 13 re |'° n . num bedng about 10,000 men with five
Bolsheviks oTr fi / htln S ^ rexis tence, and the Armenians and
m?ns a „H k h Baku numbenng about 11,000 with 100 machine
The 33 guns (of whlc l 1 onl y six were said to be serviceable)
JlUance fonSH UP , CO f mpnsed , an unnatural anti-Mahomedan
i fiance formed only for.mutual preservation.
, , t a PP eared that the enemy intended to move on Baku
clear up the situation in the Caucasus and carry out a military
occupation of Persian Azerbaijan. Considerable jealousy and
h !d tl( i n their P lans and activities in Trans-Caucasia
had alr ea dy broken out between the Germans and Turks.
There was, continued General Marshall, a wide-spread ex-
treme democratic party in Persia which was primarily anti-
Bntish and was strongly supported by German agents! while
e power and action of the pro-British party were handicapped
by the recent German successes in France and by the dis
turbances in South Persia. If, however, the Turks took Azer
baijan, Persian national feeling would probably be aroused
against them just as the menace of a Turkish advance in Persia
lad already gone far to alienate the Jangalis from the enemy's
cause and to facilitate our reaching Enzeli. Tribes near and
o the north of Zenjan had also shown some willingness to
undertake service on our side.
In considering the role of Dunsterforce the length of the
communications had to be realised. This made it impossible
to support a force north of Hamadan with any prospect of
success against an enemy advancing from Tabriz. With the
mobile column, of which three companies and two guns w r ere
due to reach Kazvin on the 17th June, and with Bicharakoff’s
troops there should be no difficulty in holding the Kazvin—
Enzeli road, if possible by arrangement with Kuchik Khan,
and in thus opening up communication with Baku where the
time factor was of considerable importance. Subsequent
action should, General Marshall considered, be decided by
General Dunsterville, who would be guided by events. But the
latter had heard the previous day from Baku that the Turks
had signed a treaty with the Armenians, Georgians and Tartars,
ceding territory to Turkey and giving her the right to move
troops over the Trans-Caucasian railways ; that Turkish troops
were moving by road towards Baku and would soon be moving
there and to Julfa by rail; and that the Baku Armenians re
fused to be bound by this treaty. In these circumstances it