"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [ظ‎‎١‎٨] (٥٤٠/٤١)

12 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
time in a very efficient state and was meeting all require
ments, was still receiving additional craft from overseas.*
The German and Turkish accounts show that on the 3rd
June, General von Falkenhayn, as a result of a personal
inspection of the Mesopotamian front and of discussions with
Enver Pasha, reported to the German Supreme Command that
an offensive against Baghdad was feasible ; and he recommended
that the German and Turkish forces for this undertaking
should be formed into two armies under his command. He
considered a British offensive likely in the autumn or winter,
both in Palestine and in Mesopotamia, and that the Turks
might have to divert a part of the force destined for Mesopotamia
to the Palestine front. The German Emperor approved this
recommendation and General von Falkenhayn with a large staff
of German and a few Turkish officers at once started his prepara
tions, which were thenceforward pushed on continuously.
They were largely directed to improving the long and imperfect
lines of communication from the Bosphorus to Aleppo and
thence to Mosul on the one hand and down the Euphrates on
the other. The difficulties were considerable. The capacity of
the railway to Aleppo from Haidar Pasha w r as strictly limited
by the still incomplete tunnels through the Taurus and Amanus
ranges ; the Baghdad railway had only reached the vicinity
of Nisibin, whence the indifferent roads and inadequate
transport were barely capable of maintaining even the reduced
numbers of the Turkish Sixth Army ; the only craft it was
possible to use on the Euphrates were small launches and the
native shakturs, besides the keleks (rafts) which had to be broken
up for transport by land for the return journey up stream ; and
the desert route from Aleppo to and down the Euphrates valley
would require much work to fit it for mechanical transport
traffic. Supplies were, however, said to be procurable locally
in sufficient quantities.
General von Falkenhayn and his staff took their task in hand
with characteristic energy and thoroughness. Arrangements
were made for hundreds of motor lorries, for the extension of the
Baghdad railway to Mosul, for the improvement of roads
leading to the front in this direction, for the construction of
thousands of shakturs at Jerablus on the Euphrates, for the
organisation of a good land line of communications down the
f® cords do not contain a statement of the number and nature of river
^ 1 w ° po , t ^ mia at this P eriod ; but in a telegram to the War Office of
tne 18th May, 1917, the Commander-in-Chief in India gave 918 as the total
num er of river craft in Mesopotamia, with 148 more under order from India.