"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [ظ‎‎٢‎٠‎٥] (٥٤٠/٤١٥)

350 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
the confirmation of von Kress’s position, and lastly the dominating influence
of the Germans are opposed to the interests of the State. I do not suppose
we shall be deprived of a voice in questions regarding the life of the people,
nor that, in the execution of his duty, Falkenhayn will do anything prejudicial
to the interests of the State. But if the defence of Sinai is carried out by two
armies under the orders of von Kress and the Seventh Army Commander
respectively, and Falkenhayn is in supreme command, the interests of the
country will not be well served. All difficulties would be avoided if General
Falkenhayn comes under the orders of the man who is in command of Syria
and Hejaz. By this arrangement, the senior official would be a Turk
responsible to our Government, and having in his hands all internal political
and administrative matters. Falkenhayn would exercise a command
restricted to military questions only, while the lines of communication,
administration of the districts, supplies and areas behind the front, would be
under one of our own race.
With regard to my remaining in command of the Seventh Army, till now
I have been an independent army commander. If the interests of the country
require it, I should not object if relegated to an inferior position. But there
is a delicate point to be considered first. When the Seventh Army has been
despatched, future operations will tend to mingle my troops with those of
von Kress. It would be bad policy to allocate troops to each commander
and it would be preferable to put them all as they arrive under von Kress.
In that case my Army Headquarters would become superfluous and von Kress
would gradually assume command of all troops in the field. If the situation
in the future develops in this way, and the interest of the country requires it,
I am resigned to my role as a spectator. My duty will be to command without
demur the smallest part of the front where my troops may intervene. That
is to say, if my troops are to act independently I shall command. This point
must be decided.
If the administration of Syria is not handed over to Falkenhayn, Your
Excellency can trust me not to obstruct the Germans in any way. Though
it is necessary to escape from the predicament in which we find ourselves
in company with Germany, I am opposed to their policy of taking advantage
of our misfortune and the prolongation of the war to turn us into a German
colony and exploit all our resources. Our Government must be jealous and
independent like the Bulgarians. I assure you that when the Germans
understand that we mean to guard our independence, they will respect us
more than the Bulgarians. To continually keep oneself in the background
will not inspire respect or justice in any ally, especially the Germans. The
more we give the more they will grasp. Falkenhayn, even now, is bold
enough to say that he is a German before everything and that German
interests come first. In Aleppo and Syria and on the Euphrates it is
impossible to be blind to what German policy and German interests mean.
If a German commander is in a position to order Turks to die by thousands,
it is obvious that the interests of the State are not being watched. From the
day on which Falkenhayn arrived, he sent German lieutenants to the chiefs
of the tribes to establish direct relations—" The Arabs are enemies of the
Turks. We can gain their friendship as we are neutral,” said Falkenhayn
to me, an army commander. He understood from the very first that the Iraq
project was hopeless, so he has adopted the exploitation of the country as his
aim. In truth, he has taken all Arabia under German protection, and has now
begun the second phase of his plan. Abandoning his Iraq objective, he now
discusses the chance of an offensive in Sinai. What will it be in two months,
attack or defence ? The talk of an offensive is only an alluring pretext
by which the Germans hope to seize Syria and Arabia. If in two months the
offensive is unfavourable and the defence of Palestine with all the troops
proves feasible, there is no doubt we shall be very indebted to Falkenhayn
if he gains a great success. But in that case the Government and country
will pass from our hands and we shall become a German colony. To this
end Falkenhayn is wasting the gold in our Treasury and shedding the blood