"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [و‎‎١‎٥‎٢] (٥٤٠/٣٠٨)

CASPIAN SITUATION
249
to Kermanshah and Hamadan, while south of Tabriz they were
in considerable strength and had obliged our troops to evacuate
the Kuflan Kuh, the strongest obstacle to their advance.*
He would like to withdraw all troops between Kazvin and
Enzelif and to concentrate adequate fighting forces at Kazvin
and Hamadan, with detachments at Zenjan, Bijar and Sehneh.
This opinion, he said, was based mainly on the tactical situation
influenced by the great difficulties of maintenance, which had,
moreover, been increased by the influx of the Jelu refugees.
In another telegram of the same day General Marshall said
that he was recalling General Dunsterville and breaking up his
Mission, whose personnel would be employed with the Urmia
Brigade, and elsewhere in Persia, while all the troops in
North Persia would come under the direct orders of General
Thomson. J
On the 18th September General Marshall repeated telegrams
sent the previous day from Enzeli by General Dunsterville and
Commodore Norris. General Dunsterville had promised to
pay the Caspian fleet if it would join us and he hoped to receive
a favourable reply after its representative had seen Bicharakoff
at Petrovsk. Commodore Norris said that he could man three
or four ships with British personnel, using Russians for the
engine room ; that there was sufficient oil available at Enzeli
and Krasnovodsk ; and that he could carry out his original
orders if Enzeli was strongly held with reasonable harbour
defence. General Dunsterville said that, when we had the
armed ships ready, there was no reason to fear the Caspian
fleet, as it lacked unity of control and was short of ammunition.
General Marshall added that he was sending orders for a naval
party with guns, which had been stopped at Kazvin, to be sent
to Enzeli at once, as well as other naval details from Basra
and Baghdad.
On the same day the War Office telegraphed to General
Marshall emphasising the importance to us of obtaining control
of the Caspian and giving orders that Enzeli should not be
evacuated unless military necessity absolutely compelled it as
a last resort. § * * * §
* In a previous telegram of the same date General Marshall had reported
that the Turks about the Kuflan Kuh had made no further advance.
t The evacuation of Enzeli was actually ordered on the 17th September
and elicited strong protests from Commodore Norris.
| General Fraser succeeded General Thomson in command of the 14th
Division.
§ This order was repeated by General Marshall to General Thomson on
the 19th.