"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [و‎‎٢‎٠‎٥] (٥٤٠/٤١٤)

APPENDIX XLII.
349
a^nst f 7 „S D
ZlVt^r ^iXe^n ";i“^r >miC
very^sever^blow^to'the^'country*^ ^t 0 may
n °On^th^ H^^antTsina^fr 011 ^^^ 11 only wait and\ee° U * d
and mihtary'objectivt Lnd 2 ™ tao7 k mTv 5,64 hiS P 0 '*^
achieve his purpose. To cre'ate a Moslem'power suL'St^o BriSk J°
form a Christian state in Palpciinp ^ a.- i. rvient to rsntain, to
Turkey her most prosperous provinces as well as hi Hest Uen< i!’ V tear . from
predominance, are the British aims For u destr °y her last religious
is to be extinguished. T^tte exigenciesth". “'.T "“l 0ur life itself
us to be ready for an attack in the West and to forest* u 4 *! 5 ' Sltuatl ? n require
which he is preparing on the borders of Syria In th^TOnt’S nf dV ff
it is useless to think of the recapture of Baghdad with our hs t r5£ves
£T g "ored emy ' ^ m ° S4 P °"' erfUl a, * d m0St P re P are «. - in sS^Sfcan^
of trdfvLm wScf^oL^o^t ^LyT^akt J!' ** هذه التواريخ تقريبية eB ' C4iVM
After two months’ marching they would be nothing more than arehhi*"?
use a slight exaggeration. On/ s^«„r s and
the enemy s railways and ships to Baghdad. Finally one of ^
wo*S m“y fU4U,ty ° f 4he Plan iS 4hal after ‘'™ marchingtgimenk
of ^Ir'“Lthe^lSid we^t’^fer 8 ‘tte 5 '^ 1 ' l‘not'see tt** ^d
of writing of the greatest perils before us out of P pure pesstmSm “hti Tre
is life and hope, we must search for a road out of our troubles ’ 1 th
In my opinion the decisions we should take to-day are •
iJ a Ll n tTf ly Strengthen the administration, and security of life. Officers
[ OT .f e Sendaxmene, reorganisation as far as possible of justice commerce
and food supplies to check corruption, or at least to confine it to its narrowest
™ lts * 80 T t f hat tl ^ e country will have a firm and healthy base from which
to work If a prolongation of the war brings more trouble and calamity to us
we shall at any rate have our country and people behind us. We must not
allow them to be a broken reed. ot
mi 1 lltary P ollc y should be defensive, and every possible reserve
should be religiously nursed. Not a single reserve should be permitted to
serve outside the Empire. The question as to whether the Sinai front can
be best secured by attack or defence cannot be decided to-day. The enemy in
that quarter is supenor to us in men and means. It is practically impossfble
to expect all our reinforcements in Sinai before some months have passed
It is probable that the enemy will try to gain a decision against the Croons
now in front of him before others arrive. Besides, while we are desoatrhiiL
th^aid^f thei^ 011 ^ ^ x 611118 * 1 can al . so cal1 u P° n more reinforcements with
d i h , Perfected communications. Consequently even if the enemy
oes not attack now it is within the bounds of possibility that we should be
still more inferior after our concentration. ThuV, as it is impossible to say
when our troops from Aleppo will arrive at the Sinai front,^t is essential
exact°S d d e e r termi 1SSUe ? the imme ! iiate despatch of the Seventh Army. To
l ? at the momen t how these troops will be finally employed
"tmost economy is impossible, from a study of maps, from a military
oWolScuS L he fo gr 4 i Army has b “" s “ 4 sa “ 4h 4ha -y -
and^thA W Syria and He 3 az have been under the orders of a Musalman
Musalman n ThS^H° n f ^ ** هذه التواريخ تقريبية *? entrusted independently to anothe^
I am satisfied Tw I ?i? °v f th ® C ° untry squires this system of command,
m satisfied that ralkenhayn s advent, his management of the coming events.