"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [ظ‎‎١‎٧‎٢] (٥٤٠/٣٤٩)

288 HISTORY OF THE WAR: MESOPOTAMIA
About midday, on receipt of General Leslie’s report (timed
11 a.m.) of the enemy’s unexpected strength about Mushak,
General Cobbe directed the 63rd Squadron, R.A.F., to send
up as many aeroplanes as possible to assist the 1 /tii Division
by bombing the enemy. He also issued orders that as much
as possible of the 52nd Infantry Brigade should be equipped
with pack transport* and sent to reinforce the 34th and 51st
Brigades, that the bridge at Fat-ha (which had been taken up)
was to be reconstructed and that the 55th Infantry Brigade
was to be ready to cross it at short notice to reinforce the 17th
Division.
At 1 p.m.f General Cobbe also sent orders that the 7th
Cavalry Brigade was to move back to Fat-ha to obtain rations
and await orders. In reply he heard at 2.50 p.m. that the 7th
Cavalry Brigade had already moved up the Tigris with orders
to return at dusk, when it would be ordered to move back
to Fat-ha so as to be south of Tel-ad-Dhahab by dawn on the
27th. The advance of this brigade was carried for about
ten miles northward of the Little Zab without opposition, as
on its approach the few enemy cavalry seen at once re-forded
the Tigris. Its advance had the great advantage that it
screened from the enemy the wider movement of the
11th Cavalry Brigade. It is noteworthy, in this connection,
that after about the 20th October no aeroplanes appear to
have assisted the Turks during these operations.
On the Tigris right bank General Leshe decided between
1 and 2 p.m., as a result of his personal reconnaissance, that
he would not attempt a further attack till next morning. For
this, the line of advance taken by the 112th Infantry appeared
to be the best. But it would mean a slow and arduous operation
with few positions even for mountain guns ; the infantry of
the 51st Brigade were much exhausted by their exertions of
the past few days ; J and, owing to the transport shortage and
difficulties, it had been necessary to reduce the rations of all
the advanced troops in the 17th Division by a quarter. General
Leshe decided, therefore, that the main attack next day should
be made by Colonel Coningham’s column.
At 2.25 p.m. General Cobbe learnt from an air report that at
12.40 p.m. the 11th Cavalry Brigade was about four miles from
* More pack mules had come up from the line of communication.
| About this time the aeroplanes of the 63rd Squadron returned and their
observers reported that their bombs had had little effect on the well-entrenched
enemy in the Mushak position.
X During the 25th/26th October the brigade casualities totalled 618.