مجموعة ٦/ ٩١ "المملكة العربية السعودية. سياسة حكومة بريطانيا. مسألة اتئمانات وضمان المساعدة لابن سعود." [و‎‎٣‎٣‎٨] (٦٨٠/٦٧٦)

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OP HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
EASTERN (Arabia).
November 9. 1939.
CONFIDENTIAL.
"I * r *
f 4*. L'
Section 2.
FE 7409/177/25]
[ '953 J
Copy No. 113
Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received November 9.)
(No. 150.)
My Lord,
Jedda, October 24. 1939.
DURING my recent visit to Riyadh I sent brief telegrams on the various
matters discussed, and on my return to Jedda I have the honour to submit some
general remarks, in the light of my visit, on the relations at this critical moment
between His Majesty’s Government and Ibn Saud.
2. I found the King not at all inclined to sit on the fence, waiting to see
how the war in Europe would go, but outspoken in his sympathy for the Allies
and anxious to do all he could to ensure that there should be nothing to prevent
the Arabs of the territories with which Great Britain and France have special
relations from co-operating with them. One of the first remarks of the Amir
Saud (in the presence of an American doctor, too) was : “ We are on the side of
the Allies/’ and he said something of the same kind when 1 called on him to say
good-bye; but his father was just as outspoken. Nor has Ibn Saud been content
with assurances to us. Apart from his general support in the Palestine question
and his remarkable frankness in communicating to us over the last two years
some at least of the particulars of negotiations with Iraq, Italy, Japan and
i Germany, we have recent evidence of his decision not to proceed, while the war
j lasts, with the negotiations for the supply of arms and ammunition from
! Germany, and of his consent to receive a representative of His Majesty’s Govern
ment to reside at Riyadh for a considerable time.
3. Ibn Baud’s desire that His Majesty’s Government should be on the
winning side in the present war agrees with the tenor of his previous words and
acts, but is none the less satisfactory, in view of the relative insignificance of the
material help we have been able to give him in contrast to the greater generosity
(as it might seem) of the Italians and, more recently, the Germans, in letting
him have, in part at low prices and in part as a gift, arms and ammunition which
he badly needs and which we are unable to furnish on any terms. Ibn Baud
estimates Danaan gifts at their true value, and accepts them without illusions.
On the other hand, we know, from copies of correspondence which he has shown
us, that he has not secured the German arms by protestations of exclusive
friendship. He seems to have told the Germans flatly that his interests were too
closely connected with those of His Majesty’s Government for him to adopt a
policy hostile to their interests, and in the end to have forced the Germans to
accept the position and to sign the agreement for the supply of arms without
insisting on the condition that Ibn Baud should agree to observe neutrality in
case of any dispute which might arise between Germany and Great Britain. Bo
eager were the Germans to conciliate Ibn Saud that, after the outbreak ol war,
Herr Woermann gave Khalid-al-Qarqani, the King’s envoy, an official letter
offering to supply the arms now, to be exported to Jedda on a Netherlands steamer
at Saudi risk, or to hold them, in the safe-keeping of the German Government,
at the disposal of His Majesty. The King decided, however, not to proceed with
the transaction during the war. He was grateful to His Majesty’s Government
for the suggestions as to the best means to overcome the difficulties of finance, but
he felt that the political objections were insuperable. He feared that, if the
arms were shipped to him, the fact would be used as a basis for exaggerated
claims by the Germans, whose wireless propaganda about Khalid’s visit to Berlin
will be' remembered, and that his action might be misinterpreted in Arab
countries and elsewhere. This decision is satisfactory to His Majesty s Go\em
inent, who do not wish to see even £120,000 in gold or free exchange pass into
German hands. With characteristic frankness, Ibn Saud did not claim that
political considerations alone underlay his decision; on the contrary, he said with
a grin that after the war German arms might be going for nothing. Nevertheless,
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