مجموعة ٦/ ٩١ "المملكة العربية السعودية. سياسة حكومة بريطانيا. مسألة اتئمانات وضمان المساعدة لابن سعود." [ظ‎‎٣‎٣‎٨] (٦٨٠/٦٧٧)

2
I am sure that he did not wish to give the German cause even the small hllip that
the confirmation of the order might have given it.
4. It might be expected that Ibn Saud, as a dictator himsell, would
sympathise with the totalitarian States, but that is not so. Ibn Saud does not
regard himself as a dictator of the Hitler order, but as a monarch limited by th e y*
precepts of the Quran. On one occasion he accepted as correct a suggestion
made that he ruled under a “religious constitution. To him there is » 1
fundamental difference between the theocracy of Saudi Arabia and the depotism,
tempered neither by the fear of God nor readiness to listen to human advice, or
a man like Hitler. But he frankly says that Hitler is mad, and quotes an Arabic
proverb which affords a close parallel to “ Quern deus vult perdere. ^ hrad
proof of Hitler’s madness Ibn Saud cites the pact with Soviet Russia, which he
believes will be one of the causes of Germany s downfall. His own hostility to
Soviet Russia is intense. Self-interest, injured by the cessation of the stream
of pilgrims from Moslem communities now under Soviet rule, may have something
to do with this, but Ibn Saud also dislikes a rule which can find no room for
i the religion and the social system of Islam. The prolonged negotiations between
Soviet Russia and Turkey gave him acute anxiety. His suspicions of Turkey,
as nursing an undying grudge against the Arabs, are well known to His Majesty s
Government, and it was not surprising that he should imagine Soviet Russia as
offering Turkey a free hand to the south in return for a free hand for Russia
in the Balkans. The news of the signature of the pact between Great Britain,
France and Turkey, which arrived just before I left Riyadh, did something to
reassure His Majestv.
5. Having taken up an attitude of neutrality so benevolent towards the
Allies it is natural that Ibn Saud should desire that Palestine should cease to
be a cause of irritation to the Arab world. Although he ridicules German
propaganda as overdone, he fears lest the Arabic broadcasts from Berlin,
conducted with vitriolic skill and force by such people as Yunus Bahri, may
have some effect on Arab minds, and he considers that the restoration of peace in
Palestine and some form of open support by the Palestinian Arabs for the Allied
cause would be the greatest blow to Germany. I found him still in the stage
of the armistice-amnesty idea. One can understand that, having no obligations
of alliance towards His Majesty’s Government such as those of Iraq and Egypt,
he should be unwilling to make yet another appeal to the Palestinian Arabs unless
he has something to offer. Nevertheless, he accepted the statement which I gave
him, based on Foreign Office telegram No. 133 of the 2nd October, explaining
the attitude of His Majesty’s Government towards the Mufti and towards a
possible appeal by the Arab States to the people of Palestine. He conveyed this
statement to Jamal-al-Husaini, who was then in Riyadh, and telegraphed it to
his representative in Bagdad, with the suggestion that Iraq should approach
Egypt and he himself the Imam of the Yemen, with a view to concerted action
to bring about peace in Palestine.
1 6. We need have no fear that Saudi Arabia may become a centre for anti-
British intrigue during the war. Anti-British broadcasts will be listened to.
but only in private houses; wireless broadcasts in coffee-shops are not permitted,
and a Royal decree forbids the populace to discuss the international situation,
with which, it says, they have no concern. The ground for the decree is stated
therein to be the inherent unsuitability of the Holy Land of Islam for
propaganda. This decree suits His Majesty’s Government very well, since we
cannot compete with our enemies in vituperation. Dr. Grobba, who, on having
to leave Iraq, wanted to make for Riyadh by land, was deflected from his purpose
by an ingenious excuse, and Ibn Saud told me with great vehemence that he knew
Dr. Grobba only wanted to engage in propaganda, and that he was resolved not
to have him in Riyadh at any cost. We know that Ibn Saud also refused to
allow Dr. Ruwaiha, the doctor to the German Legation in Bagdad, to come to
Saudi Arabia. He showed me a number of papers about Mizhir-al-Shawi,
whose journey from Iraq to Saudi Arabia had excited suspicion; they tended to
show that the main, if not the only, reason for the journey was to escape
vengeance or punishment for a tribal murder, and proved in any case that
Ibn Saud was keeping a close watch on the man. He declared with great
vehemence that he was entirely opposed to having to receive the Mufti in his
| territory a man whom he despises as a shifty self-seeker. Jamal-al-Husaini,
who had gone to Riyadh from Bagdad to see him, was received in audience only