مجموعة ٦/ ٩١ "المملكة العربية السعودية. سياسة حكومة بريطانيا. مسألة اتئمانات وضمان المساعدة لابن سعود." [و‎‎٣‎١‎٢] (٦٨٠/٦٢٤)

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(“) The King of the Yemen.
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geographically more restricted and is confined to the region where France actually
exercises political power; France is not thought by the Arabs to wish to extend her
influence in the Near East. Moreover, French interests correspond pretty well
with those of Britain. Italy—whatever Ahmed Bin Yehia’s( 3 ) flirtations with her
'"Nay amount to—has no foothold in the Near Eastern Arab countries; she is
^'sartily hated by the vast majority of the Arabs, including Yehia, and would be
even if nothing stood against her other than her action in Libya. But the destinies
of the Arab world are inevitably linked with Britain’s, and all the Arabs prefer
to be associated with Britain rather than with any other European Power.
5. 1 his being so, the Arabs could not, at the beginning of the war, regard
Britain s situation with indifference. But the situation is no longer what it was
on the 3rd September. Then the struggle apeared to be a straight fight between
the Allies and Germany : the latter having no interests in the Arab world, and
the former being, in the King’s view, assured of ultimate victory, the war was not
immediately alarming to the Arab countries. The only Near Eastern State likely
to take material part—however slight—in the war was Turkey, whom the Arabs
thought to be on the point of concluding an alliance with the Allies. Now, how
ever, two things have happened that change the situation and create a potential
danger to the Arab countries :
6. Russia has taken a hand in the war, showing herself to be, if not an entirely I
docile tool of the Nazi’s, then, at least, no friend of the Allies; and Turkey has j
taken up an attitude that amounts to neutrality, and has especially insisted that /
she will take no action directed against Russia.
7. The danger to the Arabs from this new situation lies in this : Germany
will seek to damage British interests wherever she can; that she is already seeking
to attack Britain in the Arab world is shown by her broadcasts to the Arabs (the
King mentioned particularly that German radio had issued invitations to Arabs
to go to Germany, and had recommended various “ safe ” routes through neutral
countries). But the Arabs are a sceptical folk, and the Germans must be aware
on what stony ground their gospel falls. Hence it follows they will attempt a
more direct, material attack on Britain’s position in the Near East. Their only
route to the Arab countries is through Russia.
8. At first sight Russia’s contact with the Arabs seems far from direct.
But in reality only two States separate them : Turkey and Iran. The Arabs
have no faith either in the strength of these two “ barriers ” or in their abiding
friendship for the Arabs. Where is the Pact of Saadabad ? Turkey has already
declared that she will not fight Russia. It is not impossible that differences
between Iraq and Iran may occur.
9. The present war situation thus involves a threat to the security of the
Arab States themselves as well as a threat to British interests in them. In
defending themselves against this threat the Arabs would be defending British
interests. (Here the King asked Sheikh Yusuf to read the “ statement ” to me.)
10. But, as shown in the “statement,” the Arab line of defence is at
present weak for three reasons : (1) The natural poverty of the Arab countries
and their lack of military equipment; (2) the internal weakness of the regimes :
Egypt and Iraq, the two strongest Arab States, were to some extent disabled by
party strife—especially Iraq, where the Shi’a sect is an important cause of
instability; (3) the lack of union between the various States.
11. If, then, the King argued, the danger he apprehends does not seem
entirely imaginary to His Majesty’s Government, it is clearly in their interests
to strengthen the Arab States as much as they can. This can be done in two
ways : (1) By giving material assistance; (2) by helping the various Arab States
to compose their differences and thus promoting the unity of the Arab world.
12. The King laid great emphasis on the important part His Majesty’s
Government could play in bringing about Arab unity. He appeared to conceive
of Great Britain as the mediator and adviser of a federation of Arab States.
There is no one man or one State in the Arab world strong enough and
disinterested enough to command the respect of all the rest. But Great Britain
has the respect of all the Arabs. True she is not, strictly speaking,
“ disinterested,” but her interests are not those of dynastic and family prestige
and fortune, but economic and strategic interests, the service of which need not
clash with the furtherance of purely Arab interests—indeed, the service of