مجموعة ٦/ ٩١ "المملكة العربية السعودية. سياسة حكومة بريطانيا. مسألة اتئمانات وضمان المساعدة لابن سعود." [و‎‎٣‎٣‎٤] (٦٨٠/٦٦٨)

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
EASTERN (Arabia).
. CONFIDENTIAL
—
December 22. 1939.
Section 2.
[E 8086/2/>3/25]
Copy No.
Sir R. Bullard to Viscount Halifax.—(Received December 22.)
(No. 170.)
My Lord, Jedda, December 2, 1939.
IN any country where the power is concentrated in the hands of a personal
ruler the extent to which his word can be relied upon is a matter of supreme
importance to the foreign representative who is called upon to deal with him. We
have assurances from Ibn Saud which, taken at their face value, lead us to believe
that we can count upon his benevolent neutrality in this war—unless, as I have
frequently said, the Allies should be defeated, when at the last moment he might
well try to absorb some of the smaller Arab States on the Persian Gulf in order to
forestall a similar advance from Iraq or Iran. On the other hand, when the war
began the Amir Abdullah seems to have believed that Ibn Saud was threatening
his territory, and although the Amir subsequently stated that he was satisfied on
this head, it is always possible that the recent movement of Saudi forces to the
north may revive his suspicions. It seems probable that the movement is towards
the Iraq frontier, however, and some local wiseacres forecast an attempt to seize
Koweit while His Majesty’s Government are busy elsewhere. The fact that an
emissary of Ibn Saud’s visited Herr Hitler just before war broke out was bound to
give rise to speculation. The Germans gave the visit a political tinge in their
news, and Ibn Saud was not in a position to divulge to the world the information
he gave to His Majesty’s Government about the object of the visit. Hence a
belief in some circles in/Jedda (the Turkish Legation, for instance, who have little
direct contact with Ibn Saud) that the Saudi Government are pro-German.
2. My own belief is that, if we take Ibn Saud's assurances at their face
value, we shall not be far out. The behaviour of Iraq in the matter of Koweit |
early this year, the assumption of a sort of moral protectorate over the smaller
Arab States in the Gulf by certain political and journalistic circles in Iraq, and j
the conduct of Nuri Pasha as seen through the eyes of Ibn Saud. are sufficient to
account for the despatch of Saudi forces towards the Iraq border, even if the 1
King had not had trouble there from tribes which, he believes, try to play off the j
two Governments against each other. I do not believe that he would welcome a
German victory, even if Germany had not allied herself with Russia. The
attitude which he has held towards His Majesty’s Government during the three
years I have been here seems to me consistent with his wider interests. His
attitude was well described to my French colleague recently by Fuad Hamza, who
said that the King would never quarrel with His Majesty’s Government about the
Mufti, for instance, for while it was a Moslem and Arab interest for him to
support the Palestinian claim, he considered that the wider interests of the Arab
and Moslem world compelled him to remain close friends with His Majesty’s
Government.
3. Ibn Saud has never pretended that his attitude towards His Majesty’s
Government is due to mere affection. He claims, for instance, to have told the
Hadhramis, who came fishing for sympathy, that if the British were not in the
Hadhramaut some other Power would be, and that they might think themselves
fortunate to have secured the best of the Powers. He has often said that, as an
Arab, he sympathises with any movement for Arab independence, but next to
independence he considers British rule or protection to be the least galling
arrangement. When justifying his support for Great Britain in the East, he
points to the independence of Iraq and Egypt and the constitutional development
in India, saying that, while His Majesty’s Government have doubtless acted in
accordance with their conception of their own interests, no other European Power
would have shown such consideration to the peoples concerned. Finally, he always
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