مجموعة ٦/ ٩١ "المملكة العربية السعودية. سياسة حكومة بريطانيا. مسألة اتئمانات وضمان المساعدة لابن سعود." [و‎‎٣‎١‎١] (٦٨٠/٦٢٢)

3
which are necessary for Britain and the advantage to be gained from that. And
in addition to that the good name which may result from that is the best effect
on that interest, and will be a blow for the enemy. For all these reasons we set
^sforth our views as follows :—
First: We do not doubt that the British Government is fully convinced that
all the Arabs do not consider that the German or the Soviet Governments have any
intention to make war on the Arabs; there would be no interest for them in that.
Second: The whole of the Arabs, whether those who agree with the British
Government or those moslems who are estranged from it, including those whose
views are contrary to those of the British Government, in fact we believe every
one of them, would be very sorry to see any enemy defeat the British Government,
because they are convinced that their interests impel them and oblige them to
combine with them and to have friendship for them; and that should any enemy
prevail over the British they would suffer as much as Britain. Now if this is
plain to the British Government, then in our view the Arabs, who are in great
numbers, do not possess at the present moment sufficient strength to enable them
to oppose any disasters, if any sudden change in the present state of affairs should j
take place which might threaten the Arab world with danger. They do not
possess sufficient force to combat such events, in the first place because the
equipment which would enable them to do their duty is small, and, in the second
place, because of the want of union among them, whether between Governments
or between races; and in the third place there exists no famous man who could
do what was necessary when the time came, and make the Arabs combine; for the
pi esent time is not such as would call forth a common programme and a united
policy. Fourthly, we see that danger threatens the Arabs and their friends. And
treaties of alliance, made without a binding link between persons who will do
what is their duty and will oblige the people to strengthen those treaties—without
that such treaties are worth little. For instance, the Treaty of Sa’dabad—when
the time came all of them followed their own interests and abandoned the ,
principle. In view of all this, if the British Government attaches great;
importance to the Arab lands, and if it considers that a common voice and united
strength for the Arabs would be to the advantage of the British, from the point
of view of defence, and, on the other hand, would be threatening and iniurious
to the enemy, then our opinion is, that if it (the British Government) agrees then
to prolong the present state of affairs will be of no use after the entry of the
Kussians and the Germans, and the developments of the war; and we fear that
the Russians might make a sudden move in order to damage Britain and to
strengthen Germany, and confuse the Allies and the colonies of Britain. And we
fear that it (Russia) might therefore adopt a policy towards the Arab countries
on one of two sides : either on the side of the Turks, or of the Iranians; and that
would either be in enmity with the Turks and the Iranians, or by agreement with
them, and if they do that, their fundamental object will be to damage Britain
and her Allies. If the British Government shares our view, but if the matter is
out of the question, then the present state of affairs cannot go on as it is; and if
it considers that this critical situation overshadows the Arabs and their friend-
snip, then we think that the British Government should act as in the Arabic
proverb : Resolution is the father of need, the father of success : while inaction
is the father of regret, the father of sorrow.” The essential thing is that the
British Government should examine this matter and should seek the views of its
friends, and should, indeed, act with resolution and vigour, and should prepare
the^ assistance which is necessary for the events which may happen to the Arabs •
and if a calamity should befall as mentioned above, then Britain and her friends
would be prepared. And there is no might and no power, save in God l He it is
who humbles the enemy, and we look to Him to prevent the occurrence of that
which we fear; and verily a man sorrows not for his efforts to prepare to with
stand events when God frees him from danger. In this matter there is great
benefit: a check to the enemy and an assurance to the friend If the British
Government agrees with that view, then let it consult its friends and ascertain
thmr views m the matter and do what is necessary; but if this is a matter which
the British Government considers to be impossible, then no impossible thing has
been created in this way. And we hope that God will make it an impossible
thing, and will be a sufficient guard against the wickedness of our enemies - and
that He will make victory our ally and the ally of our friends.
[780 d—2]