Ext 5001/41 'PERSIA – INTERNAL (Miscellaneous despatches).' [‎121v] (242/248)

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4. Notwithstanding these I'epresentations, every conceivable form of
prevarication was indulged in by the Persian Government to keep the Japanese
Legation, which they probably regarded as their last re-insurance link with the
Axis. The question was even discussed at a secret session of the Majlis, where,
according to the Prime Minister, members were strongly in favour of the main^
tenance of relations with Japan. But the patience of His Majesty’s Government
in the United Kingdom was exhausted. In Foreign Office telegram No. 506, of
the 12th April, to Kuibyshev, it was explained that His Majesty’s Government
had decided to concentrate troops outside Tehran to be able to occupy the capital,
if necessary, and enforce the closing of the Japanese Legation. It was arranged
that Sir Reade^ Bullard would then demand an immediate audience with the
Shah and insist on the rupture of relations with Japan. The Soviet Ambassador
in London had been informed of our intention and told that, if British forces
were eventually obliged to occupy Tehran, and if the situation should so develop
as to render other measures necessary, the Soviet Government might wish to be
associated in the occupation of the capital. His Majesty’s Government would
welcome such a decision. The Persian Government, however, sensing, no doubt,
that His Majesty’s Government had made up their minds to take forceful action,
finally gave up the unequal struggle and on the 12th April instructed the
Japanese Minister to leave Persia with his staff in one week. Eventually the
legation left Tehran on the 23rd April.
5. Meanwhile, there existed other acute causes for dissatisfaction with the
Persian Government : —
(a) It was proving increasingly difficult to obtain sufficient rial currency in
exchange for sterling to finance the expenditure of the British military
authorities on road, rail and aerodrome developments in Persia. The
statutory limit of the note-issue had been reached and the Persian
Government were unwilling or unable to persuade the Majlis to
increase it. Yet clearly the work of developing communications with
Russia had to proceed.
(b) No effective measures had been taken by the Persian Government to stop
Axis propaganda or even to make it illegal.
{c) For weeks His Majesty’s Legation had been demanding, without success,
the internment of the six most notorious Persian pro-Axis
propagandists.
6. It appeared to His Majesty’s Minister desirable to clear the air by
insisting at once that all these eminently reasonable desiderata should be met and
should be included in representations to the Shah, backed by the threat of force,
and that, if possible, similar action should be taken by the Russians. In Foreign
Office telegram No. 527 it was agreed that Sir R. Bullard should seek an audience
with the Shah, but that, if satisfaction had been obtained over the departure
of the Japanese Legation by then, less drastic representations should be made.
7. The audience eventually took place on the 22nd April. It was apparent
that the movements of Russian and British troops which had taken place, and
the warnings which had been previously delivered, had been reported to His
Majesty, who was evidently aware of the possibility of the strongest action by
His Majesty's Government. The Shah expressed the keenest desire for the settle
ment of the currency question. Further, as the result of repeated and insistent
representations, a proclamation, making enemy propaganda illegal, had been
issued and published in the press. Similarly, satisfaction had also been given
that very morning over the arrest of most of the six Axis supporters; it was.
therefore, unnecessary for His Majesty’s Minister to utter any direct threat. The
negotiations on the financial issue actually culminated on the 26th May in the
signature of a financial agreement which should settle the question of rial
requirements for the duration of the war.
8. This episode certainly had the desired effect of clearing the atmosphere,
and since then considerable progress has been made in almost all respects with the
Persian Government, though insistence and much wrangling has frequently been
required. Axis sympathisers have not generally been dealt with satisfactorily,
and His Majesty’s Legation have had to arrange themselves for their internment,
first at Kermanshah and later at Ahwaz. Thanks, however, to the general co
operative attitude of the Persian police, under pressure from His Majesty s
Legation, many suspects, including Germans, have been arrested, both in Tehran