Ext 5001/41 'PERSIA – INTERNAL (Miscellaneous despatches).' [‎27v] (54/248)

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Elburz range and the coastal fringe to the north of it. (The area is contained
approximately within a line drawn north-east from Qazvin to another at
Khurramabad, thence eastward along the Caspian coast through Aliabad to
Babul, and thence south-south-east to Semnan). On this basis they would have
remained in full control of Azerbaijan, Gilan and the north-eastern corner of
Persia, with garrisons on the Tabriz and Meshed roads within 100 miles of
Tehran on both sides of the capital. Meshed, it is true, was not included within^
the “ Soviet zone ” as defined in the Soviet-Persian exchange of letters after the
occupation of the country; but on the strength of an oral declaration made by
the Soviet Ambassador at that time troops were stationed on the Meshed airfield,
and a moral influence was thereby established over the town which became in the
course of time the practical equivalent of inclusion within the Soviet zone. The
Russians would therefore in all probability have claimed to treat Meshed as part
of their original zone for the purposes of any new arrangement based on the
sacred principles of “equilibrium.”
30. Confronted with this dilemma, the embassy put forward the only
proposal which seemed at all likely to solve it, viz., the negotiation of a total
withdrawal on both sides, with special arrangements for the protection of the
oilfields area, in the absence of British troops, by a police force on the lines of the
Palestine police and theoretically under Persian control. It was realised that
this proposal might well appear too drastic to the military authorities responsible
for the security of the oilfields. But it was pointed out that the risks of sabotage
by the Japanese would be very much less than the risks of sabotage by the Germans
had been in the difficult days before the occupation of South Persia; and that
in the last analysis a continued Soviet occupation of the north until six months
after the peace with Japan was likely, by bringing about the complete disintegra
tion of Persia, to deprive us of the use of the oilfields for good and all—among
other and still more serious consequences.
31. This proposal was telegraphed to London on the 31st January; and
there had of course been no time to consider it when the Yalta Conference took
place a week later. At this conference Persian affairs, though not on the official
agenda, were touched upon, and more than one attempt was made to persuade
the Russians to agree to discuss the question of the withdrawal of Allied troops.
The Soviet reaction was, however, completely negative and discouraging; both
Marshal Stalin and M. Molotov took the line that the exact terms of the Tripartite
Treaty should be adhered to and that there was consequently no advantage in
discussing the question of withdrawal.
32. Commenting on this unsatisfactory result, the embassy pointed out at
the beginning of March that the Russians had shown their hand. It was clear
that they wished to keep their troops in Persia as long as possible in order to
secure the strongest possible hold over the country before they went. The only
weapon left was wdde publicity, or at least the threat of it, if the Russians
maintained their obstructive attitude.
33. Such publicity w T as not sanctioned during the period under review, nor
was the threat of it used; but towards the end of March the embassy were
authorised to inform the Persian Government that His Majesty’s Government, so
far as they were concerned, “ were not opposed to Allied examination ” to see
whether some withdrawal could not be made before the treaty date for total
withdrawal, i.e., the six months’ period following armistice with Japan. This
communication undoubtedly did something to hearten the Persian Government,
and was bound in time to confirm in the mind of the Persian public the general
impression which it had already derived from the attitude of the Tudeh press,
namely, that it was the Russians alone who were opposed to the early withdrawal
of foreign troops. Obviously, however, the full benefit of publicity could only
be obtained by revealing that His Majesty’s Government had actually proposed
a withdrawal to the Soviet Government and had met with an uncompromising
refusal. Such a revelation—but nothing short of it—would completely deflate
the intensive and disloyal propaganda of the Soviet authorities in this country;
who, through the agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. of the newspapers which they control, seek to deflect
attention from their own real misdeeds in the north by painting a lurid and
entirely fanciful picture of the attempts of “ foreign capitalists ” to detach and
swallow the south.
Security.
34. The most important recent development has been an outcry in the
Persian press and agitation in the Majlis against the continued internment of
prominent Persians, for which the British authorities have been almost exclusively