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8. On the 13th February, I understand, the Majlis Deputies selected one
of their number named I’tibar to inform the Prime Minister that he no longer
had any majority in the Majlis, and Qawam resigned.
9. As the result of a secret vote of the Majlis, it became evident that Soheily
*Nivas the favourite candidate of the Deputies; he obtained 72 votes against 18
for Sa’ed. and a deputation waited on the Shah to inform him of that fact. The
Shah informed them that he would have preferred Sa’ed, the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, as Prime Minister, and asked them to think it over, hut this had no effect.
On the 15th February Soheily formed a Government and he introduced it to the
Majlis two days later, the members being as follows :—
His Excellency M. AH Soheily : Prime Minister and Minister of the
Interior.
His Excellency M. Muhammad Sa’ed Maraghai : Minister for Foreign
Affairs.
His Excellency M. Sayyid Muhammad Tadayyun : Minister of State.
His Excellency M. Hussein Sami'i : Minister of State.
His Excellency M. Amanullah Ardalan : Minister of Health.
His Excellency M. Ali Asghar Hikmat: Minister of Justice.
His Excellency M. Mahmud Bader : Minister of Commerce, Industry
and Mines.
His Excellency M. Andul Hussein Hajhir : Minister of Roads.
His Excellency Marshal Amir Ahmadi : Minister for War.
His Excellency M. Ali Akbar Siassi : Minister of Education.
His Excellency M. Nasrullah Intizam : Minister of Posts and
Telegraphs.
His Excellency M. Allahyar Saleh : Minister of Finance.
He obtained a vote of confidence by a large majority on the 21st February.
10. Qawam retired to his estates at Lahijan and has been subjected to a
torrent of abuse and calumny ever since he left office. His principal assailants
have been newspaper editors whose papers he suppressed after the disorders of
the 8th December. Demands that he should be brought to trial are combined with
hints that proof has been found that he himself was responsible for the December
disorders. These critics are careful not to remind their readers that the army
and the police made no serious effort to stop the disorders until they had
continued for some hours, and none whatever to prevent the Prime Minister’s
house from being looted.
11. It is difficult to imagine that the new Cabinet of Soheily can last longer
than a few months, and it is disappointing to find that the Government of
Qawam es Sultaneh, who showed himself to be a man of energy, authority and
courage (the last quality especially was shown in his firm treatment of the
disorders of December), should last not much longer than six months. It may
be urged against him that he was old-fashioned, that he tried to do too much
himself without reference to his Ministers, and that he made certain very unwise
and unsuitable appointments. On the other hand, he was the first Prime Minister
to come out definitely on the side of the Allies; he made some very good appoint
ments of promising young men (for instance, A. H. Ebtehaj at the National Bank,
Manuchehr Eghbal at the Ministry of Health, Dr. Siassi at the Ministry of
Education and Hajhir at the Ministry of Industry). At the end, however, he
lost his grip to some extent and failed to accomplish any successful political
manipulations, and, having lost the support of both Majlis and Court, he had no
choice but to resign.
12. The prolonged crisis which I have described appears to have no signi
ficance as far as either internal or external policy are concerned, though the new
Prime Minister has been shown to be a less forceful man than his predecessor and
is unlikely to show much firmness in handling the Majlis or the press. In spite
of all our representations, both Qawam and Soheily have failed disastrously in
the past to force landlords and hoarders to disgorge their grain and to provide
bread for the people, and, were it not for the pressure of the American advisers,
the outlook would be as hopeless as it was this time last year. The fact is that
since Reza Shah left the government of Persia has been in the hands of a
relatively small clique of persons who carry on a class government in their own
interest. Many people, including the Shah, fear that at some future time the
present state of affairs, if it continues, may lead to some popular outburst, in