Ext 5001/41 'PERSIA – INTERNAL (Miscellaneous despatches).' [‎27r] (53/248)

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4 21. Overseas cargo for Russia via Persia has diminished very rapidly, so
much so that it is now being carried as part cargo on occasional ships from
the United Kingdom, United States, India and Ceylon. Aviation spirit and
alkylate (material to convert ordinary into aviation spirit) from the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company refineries at Abadan now form an important part of the
traffic. Thus, of the 60,000 tons carried by rail in March, 47,000 were Anglo-
^ Iranian Oil Company products.
^ 22. 3,000 tons per month of fuel oil has continued to be supplied from
Abadan to the northern (Soviet operated) section of the Persian railways to make
up the quantities not supplied from Baku.
23. During March the general truck assembly plant at Khorramshahr was
dismantled and despatched through Persia to a Black Sea port. The one
remaining assembly line at Khorramshahr closed down in mid-April.
24. The American Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. Command is shipping to another war
theatre fifteen out of the total of fifty-seven diesel locomotives imported to assist
in moving “Aid to Russia ” traffic.
25. The total number of Soviet prisoners of war returned to the Soviet
Union via Persia between the 27th October, 1943, and the 25th February, 1945.
was 13.063. No more will pass by this route.
The Question of Withdrawal of Allied Troops.
26. This question continued to form the subject of correspondence between
His Majesty’s Embassy and the Foreign Office. As stated in paragraph 19 of
the last quarterly report, the embassy’s original suggestion was that British
troops should be evacuated at least from Tehran as soon as the opening up of
supply routes other than the Persian should render this practicable. It was
hoped here that such action would lead before long to a corresponding Russian
withdrawal from Tehran, since the Russians could hardly afford to face the
odious comparisons which their continued presence in the capital would invite.
Their propaganda in Persia depends negatively for its effect on the lip-service
which they pay to the joint Allied guarantees of Persian sovereignty, and
positively on the belief which they surreptitiously foster that this sovereignty is
menaced only by “ the capitalist Powers.”
. 27. His Majesty’s Government were not, however, in favour of even a
partial British evacuation as a gesture, and considered that British troops could
only be withdrawn on a pan passu basis.
, ' 28. While remaining of the opinion that even the evacuation of Tehran
alone by Allied troops would be better than nothing, the embassy became more
and more convinced as time went on that a far more radical withdrawal was
required, and required soon, if Persia were to be saved from administrative
paralysis and progressive disintegration. The Russians had steadily increased
their hold over the rich northern provinces within their “ zone.” The longer
this process was allowed to continue, the smaller the chances would become of
ever dislodging them; and unless they were dislodged no Persian Government
could be expected to function as a Government should. The possibility was
therefore mooted of negotiating a British withdrawal to the oilfields area in the
extreme south-west with a corresponding and simultaneous Russian withdrawal
of equal importance in the north.
29. At this stage, however, a complication arose. The General Officer
Commanding-in-Chief, Paiforce, considered it essential for the health of any
troops retained for the protection of the oilfields that the Indian rest camp at
Karind should be maintained, and that there should be a summer training camp
(on which work had already been started) at Bisitun, with southward lines of
communication through Khurramabad. But Karind, Kermanshah (which is
20 miles west of Bisitun) and Khurramabad lie along the northern and eastern
perimeters of the British “ zone ” as defined in the letters exchanged with the
Persian Government after the occupation in August 1941. The arrangements
proposed by the general officer commanding-in-chief would no doubt have meant
a genuine reduction in the quality or intensity of the British “occupation"
#- - within large part of this zone; British troops would be much less in evidence
than before. " Nevertheless nothing short of a total withdrawal from a given area
would have stood the least chance of acceptance by the Russians as a change
» * requiring a corresponding change on their side. They would undoubtedly have
claimed—and not without some show of logic—that the most ^they were called
upon to do in these circumstances was to withdraw to “ their ” zone as defined
at the same period. And this zone was only smaller than their present zone by
an unimportant area of mountain and forest covering the central part of the