Ext 5001/41 'PERSIA – INTERNAL (Miscellaneous despatches).' [‎88r] (175/248)

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In April, at his instigation attacks were made on Persian garrisons in the Janiki
country sufficiently close to the oilfields at Masjidi Suleiman and Haft Kel to
cause a temporary anxiety for their safety.
26. At the end of last year General Headquarters, Paiforce, were concerned
about the safety of the Bushire-Shiraz road, which it was, at that time, intended
to use to a greater extent for the transport of supplies to Russia. Although there
been no serious interference with our military traffic, a series of minor rob-
p ties and hold-ups had hampered the work being done by our engineers on the
improvement and maintenance of the road, and had created some anxiety among
labourers and transport drivers. It was evident that there would be no real
security on the road until the Persian Government had established some respect
for their authority in Pars, and that this could not be achieved as long as Nasir
Qashgai continued in defiance. The Persian forces in Pars were demoralised after
a long period of inaction and were immobile through lack of transport. It was
agreed with General Headquarters, Paiforce, that the Persian Government should
be urged to take more decisive measures to ensure the security of the road and to
re-establish their authority over the Qashgai tribes. General Headquarters,
I aiforce, undertook to supply the minimum amount of mechanical transport
considered essential for the operations, to provide basic rations, blankets and
greatcoats for the gendarmerie protecting the road, in the hope that this would
lead to a more efficient performance of their duties, and to send to Shiraz a small
staff of British officers for liaison with the Persian troops, and the supervision of
the use and maintenance of this transport and the issue of the rations. The
Persian Government decided to appoint General Shahbakhti, an officer of the old
school with a reputation to maintain for courage, energy and astuteness in dealing
with the tribes, with full civil and military powers in Pars. The mere announce
ment of his appointment had on the tribal situation an immediate effect which,
however, wore off as weeks passed in inaction.
27. There may at first have been some justification for this inaction in the
delay in the arrival of the transport promised by Paiforce, without which, it is
probably true, General Shahbakhti was unable to act; but the delav was unfortu
nate in that the pro-German party, whose tool Nasir was, headed by the Deputy
Nowbakht, had time to work up a considerable agitation in Parliament and press
in favour of Nasir and against “ fratricidal warfare.” That we had pressed the
Persian Government to undertake these operations, that we were providing assist
ance and that British officers were in Pars to see that they were carried out was
well known, and the agitation inevitably assumed a strongly anti-British bias.
Only traitors, it was said, would lend themselves to British designs against the
patriotic Na.sir, whose father had so successfully foiled all British attempts to
take possession of Pars. This agitation had a harmful effect on the never very
firm decision of the Persian Government, which quickly communicated itself to
General Shahbakhti and the forces in Pars; and it was not until the end of May—
General Shahbakhti having arrived in Shiraz in February—that he allowed him
self to be persuaded that the Government really meant him to act. After an
initial set-back the first stage of the operations, of which the object was the
occupation of Firuzabad and other important places in the area dominated by
Nasir, was successfully completed by the 12 th June.
28. As was expected, as soon as it was realised that the Government really
meant business, organised opposition rapidly disintegrated, and Nasir, with an
unknown but probably not large number of followers and, according to local
reports, two Germans, is now in hiding in the hills. The Persian Air Force is
using the landing ground at Farrashband prepared bv Nasir and the Germans for
the arrival of German aircraft. Un less th e Pers ian authorities mishandle thing's
bajly the power and prestige of Nasir should now be definitelv broken; sporadic
raiding may be expected to occur for some time yet, but if the Persian Govern
ment show even a moderate degree of firmness and statesmanship they have an
opportunity of making a settlement with the Qashgai tribes that would induce
them to be well-behaved for some time. The matter will soon be of less import-
ance to our military interests as it is not intended to use the Bushire-Isfahan
road for the transport of supplies to Russia after July, but from the economic
point of view the restoration of order in tribal areas is of great importance.
29. By their successful challenge of Nasir’s bluff the Persian Government \
has restored something of its lost prestige among the tribes of the South and the
effect is already apparent. If the present Prime Minister, who also holds the
portfolio of the Interior, could spare time from his manoeuvrings to keep himself
in power, to consider how best advantage can be taken of the present favourable
position vis-a-vis the tribes, he has the opportunity of establishing better relations
with them which might go far towards eliminating the causes of tribal unrest. Y Tc
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