Ext 5001/41 'PERSIA – INTERNAL (Miscellaneous despatches).' [‎8r] (15/248)

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situation, as they depended on the army for administrative services. A decision
about British Airways was thus an essential 'preliminary to the withdrawal of
British troops.
30. r l he Foreign Office replied on the 25th August that in British post-war
plans for overseas air services Persia would not be served by any British airline,
though a service from Egypt to Tehran might be operated by the new Anglo-
Egypti&p Company if and when it was set up. Also, British Airways were in
touch with local interests in Iraq and Persia and it was His Majesty’s Govern
ment s intention that they should act as technical advisers to the Iraqi and
Persian airlines concerned. His Majesty’s Government did not therefore wish
to negotiate a long-term agreement with the Persian Government. The alterna
tives were either to maintain such facilities at Mehrabad aerodrome as to keep
British Airways in operation until the expiry of the treaty or to stop their
service to Tehran immediately.
31. The embassy answered on the 28th August that, since no British airline
would run to Persia after the expiry of the Tripartite Treaty, it would make the
evacuation of British troops from Tehran a much more clear-cut affair, and would
be better for a number of technical reasons, if British Airways service ceased
by the 2nd October, when the withdrawal of the main body of Royal Air Force
and British military forces would have been effected. In fact, the cessation of
this military line would have an excellent political effect as marking the end
of the British evacuation of Tehran. His Majesty’s Government agreed to this
proposal on the 2nd September.
32. Meanwhile the foreign Office had been repeatedly enquiring of the
embassy why Allied troops had not been withdrawn from Tehran at once as
agreed at Potsdam. The embassy replied on the 30th August that, so far as the
British troops were concerned the withdrawal began at once but to complete
it in a few days was not possible. It was complicated by many factors. The
railway was now run by the Persians and worked slowly. Signals alone must
take a considerable time to move. The 1.700 odd British troops in Tehran were
split up into small units each with equipment, stores, &c. These were moving
south all the time. Nearly all combatant troops would go on the 15th September
and headquarters and everything else except rear parties would leave on the
1st October. This methodical evacuation enabled them to make arrangements for
disposal of assets which otherwise would have been impossible. The whole scheme
of evacuation had been delayed for lack of a decision about British Airways.
Nor had it been possible to begin discussions with the Soviet authorities until
that was settled. As regards Russian withdrawal from Tehran there was no
sign of this yet, but they had so much less here than we had that that was not
surprising.
33. Anticipating His Majesty’s Government’s decision about British
Airways by a few days, the military attache to this embassy on the 28th August
approached his Soviet colleague about arranging the withdrawal. Needless to
say, he failed to elicit a reply. On the 11th September, therefore, the Foreign
Office instructed the embassy to inform the Soviet Embassy in writing exactly
what the British position in Tehran would be by the 2nd October and to request
the Soviet Embassy to supply details of the evacuation of Tehran by Soviet
troops. The embassy made the prescribed communication on the 19th September
(adding particulars about the withdrawal of British troops by the 15th October).
It stated that—
(i) by the 2nd October the British army and the Royal Air Force would
have withdrawn from Tehran except for rear parties;
(ii) by the 15th October the only British troops in Tehran would be a
liquidated party of sixty-two officers and men;
(iii) a military survey party of 105 officers and men engaged by the Persian
Government in connexion with the Ear irrigation project would be
working south of Tehran until the 30th November.
The note also asked for corresponding information about the withdrawal of
Soviet troops.
Copies of this note were sent to the Persian Government and to the American
Embassy. The Soviet Embassy has not replied to it.
34. Meanwhile the Persian Government had sent a note on the 9th September
to the British, American and Soviet Embassies offering congratulations on the
end of the war with Japan and requesting that, in accordance with article 5 of
the Tripartite Pact, Persian territory should be totally evacuated bv the
2nd March (i.e., six months after the‘signature of the Japanese armistice);