"ملف ٣١/٦١ IV [ابن سعود ١٢٠] المفاوضات الأنجلو-سعودية حول الحدود" [و‎‎١‎٣‎٧] (٥١٢/٢٨٦)

the independent rulers of the Arab States in South-Eastern Arabia. You should
emphasise the importance which His Majesty’s Government attach to their
historic position in the Persian Gulf, and the impossibility of their agreeing
to any solution which might in any way prejudice or impair that position or
injure the interests of the Arab States with whom they are in special treaty
relations.
8. At this stage you may at your discretion decide to inform King Abdul
Aziz that you are in possession of new proposals by His Majesty’s Government,
Before describing these proposals you desire, however, to make it clear why
His Majesty’s Government, after full and sympathetic enquiry into the material
facts of the situation, have not felt able to accept the boundary which the King
had himself suggested. You should then proceed to explain in detail the reasons
which prevent His Majesty’s Government from accepting the boundary proposed
in the Saudi memorandum of the 3rd April last, developing for this purpose
the relevant arguments used in discussion with Fuad Bey Hamza last summer
as set out in the records of the meetings.
9. Beginning at the northern end of the proposed Saudi line you should
point out the importance which His Majesty’s Government attach to establishing
a frontier in accordance with geographical, as well as political and tribal,
considerations. The Qatar peninsula forms a clearly defined and separate
geographical unit, and it is only reasonable that the frontier between the
Sheikhdom and its neighbours should follow the natural division between the
peninsula and the mainland. His Majesty’s Government have already expressed
readiness to depart from their strict 'legal position by recognising King Abdul
Aziz’s sovereignty as extending over the western shore of the gulf known as
the Dohat-as-Salwa and over the Ikhwan settlements at the head of the Gulf;
but they could never consent to attribute to Saudi Arabia features, such, for
example, as the Jebel Naksh, which form an integral part of the physical structure
of the Qatar Peninsula itself and have always, in fact, been an equally integral
part of the Sheikhdom. An additional factor in regard to the frontier of Qatar’
is the grant by the Sheikh to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, with the full
approval of His Majesty’s Government, of an oil concession over the
Sheikhdom of Qatar. This concession, which was granted on the 11th May
last, while not extending beyond the limits of the State of Qatar^ as claimed by
the Sheikh of Qatar and recognised as his territory by His Majesty’s Government,,
does actually extend to the south of the line claimed by King Abdul Aziz
(cf. paragraph 5 above); but the position in this respect will be already known to
His Majesty through the communication which I instructed Mr. Calvert to make
by my telegram No.Hl2 of the 20th September. Should you decide to ad\eit to' - ^*
this development, you should take the opportunity to recall the fact that
His Majesty’s Government have formally assured the Sheikh of Qatar of their
protection against any interference with his territorial rights.
10. Turning to the problem of the Khor-al-Odeid (to which Fuad Bey Hamza
attached special importance), you will explain to King Abdul Aziz that, as
Fuad Bey was informed in London, His Majesty’s Government have long
recognised officially the validity of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi s claim to the whole
of this inlet, and have regarded his territory as extending round both the Khor-al-
Dhuwaihin and the Khor-ai-Odeid up to a line, running westwards from the
northern side of the mouth of the Khor-al-Odeid, which forms the^ boundary
between the territory of Abu Dhabi and that of Qatar. His Majesty s Govern
ment naturally cannot violate or disregard their obligations to these Arab rulers
with whom, as the King has recognised by article 6 of the Treaty of Jedda, they
have long-standing and special treaty relations. Should you consider it wise or
desirable to do so, you are authorised to develop frankly to the King a further
argument which was used with Fuad Bey Hamza in London, namely, that His
Majesty’s Government have had for many years a particularly strong interest in
the chain of Arab States on the coast between Qatar and Muscat,^ that the
maintenance of this position is an important principle of British policy in the
Persian Gulf; and that it would be at complete variance with this policy for them
to agree that a powerful State such as Saudi Arabia should acquire a new
outlet to the sea on this section of the coast, to which neither political nor
geographical considerations entitle it.
11 Pursuing your replv to the claims put forward m the Saudi memorandum
of the 3rd April you should explain that a thorough reinvestigation of the-
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