"ملف ٣١/٦١ IV [ابن سعود ١٢٠] المفاوضات الأنجلو-سعودية حول الحدود" [و‎‎١‎٧‎١] (٥١٢/٣٥٤)

19. I find that in the foregoing record of the earlier part of the discussion,
I have omitted three points of some little importance as follows :—
(a) At one moment Fuad Bey gave a definite hint that a bargain might be
struck.
(b) I reinforced my arguments regarding the special position of our Persian
Gulf clients by saying that Ibn Sand was the most powerful ruler in
Arabia, and that those other States had only such strength as they
derived from their special relations with His Majesty’s Government.
Had it been otherwise, I said, Ibn Baud would have before now
absorbed Koweit and Qatar. Fuad smilingly asked whether this
would harm our interests. I replied emphatically that it would.
(c) Fuad Bey threw a question at me about oil possibilities in the Jebel
Nakhsh. I told him that I thought there might be oil there, but that
we had also reason to believe that there might be oil in the area south
west of the Dohat-as-Salwa, and that we had not allowed the discovery
of this possibility to deter us from making the Green Line offer
at an earlier stage in the discussions. Fuad Bey tried to make out
later that in claiming the Jebel Nakhsh so insistently, the Saudi
Government were influenced only by considerations connected with
the protection of Salwa in the event of raiding, &c.
20. The second part of the conversation related to the south-eastern portion
of the proposed frontier. Before we had got far, Fuad Bey raised the point
that the Saudi Government must respect the position of the King of the Yemen.
They were themselves ready to waive any claim to tribes in the Hadhramaut
hinterland, but they could not prejudice any claim which the Imam might have.
I adverted to the fact that the Saudi-Yemen Treaty of 1934 did not deal with
the Saudi-Yemen frontier east of Najran. I understood that that was because the
Imam had refused to let it be defined lest his pretensions in the Hadhramaut
should be prejudiced. After some little general discussion on this subject, I
said that it would be hopeless to bring the King of the Yemen into the negotiation
of a treaty regarding the frontiers now under discussion, but that the Saudi
Government might possibly overcome their difficulty by attaching some sort of
declaration to the effect that they did not wish to prejudice Yemen interests.
I qualified this by adding that, if such a declaration were made, it should not
mention the Hadhramaut as such. We should hold on to the Hadhramaut until
all was blue. I added an intimation, speaking quite personally, that His Majesty’s
Government on their side might have some scruples about possible Yemeni
interests in the area between the Violet Line and Najran. Fuad Bey said that
no difficulty could arise here, because, while the Saudi A emen boundary east of
Najran had not been defined, the Saudi and Yemeni Governments had an under
standing based on the attribution of tribes in the area.
21. Fuad Bey intimated that our proposed line G-H—Violet Line was
unacceptable. He put a general question as to whether I could offer any improve
ment on our proposals as a whole. I said that I was not authorised to offer
any further concessions in regard to the line south of Qatar, on which my
instructions were quite categorical; or indeed in regard to any part of our
proposals. I said guardedly, however, that as regards one portion, viz, the line
J-G, I deduced from the correspondence, though not from the text of my
instructions, that His Majesty’s Government might be prepared to put the
frontier in that part rather further to the east, if it would lead to an agreement,
but that in this case it would be more than ever necessary to consult the interests
of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. I made it clear that I was speaking only
oLthe a rea bet ween points J and G 'and had no sort of authority to go further
than our proposal regarding G-H—Violet Line.
22. Fuad Bey suggested that there would be no difficulty with the Sultan
of Muscat and Oman. Tie would agree to any frontier, because of the trouble he
had in his hinterland with two important personages, A1 Khurusi and A1 Khalili.
Fuad Bey caught on to what I had said generally about a possible modification
of the line J-G. He suggested that, if that line could be transferred to
meridian 56° E, it might be possible to devise a line further on inter
mediate between our proposed line G-H—Violet Line and that proposed in the
Saudi memorandum of the 3rd April. He thought it would be preferable if this