"ملف 61/11 IX (D 159) مسائل متنوعة خاصة بالحجاز ونجد" [و‎‎١‎٥‎٠] (٣٩١/٣١٠)

THIS DOCUMENT IS FHS property of his britannic majesty 'S government
ARABIA. April 28, 1941.
CONFIDENTIAL. Section 1.
(16036)
^ [E 1766/114/25] Copy No.
Mr. Stonehewer-Bird to Mr. Eden.—{Received April 28.)
(No. 10.)
Sir. Jedda, March 20, 1941.
IN accordance with the instructions contained in Viscount Halifax's circular
despatch of the 4th November, 1939, I have the honour to submit the following-
brief review of the situation in Saudi Arabia in 1940: —
2. Until the entry of Italy in June the war seemed to the Saudis very
remote. The chances of the combatants were weighed; a few felt that Germany
must win, the majority thought that neither side could win, and a minority,
consisting mainly of King Ibn Saud himself, were confident of a final Allied
victory. There were few, if any, who wished to see Germany win the war, there
were many who rejoiced to see France and England, who, in their opinion, were
holding down the Arabs in Palestine and Syria, take some bad knocks.
3. When France collapsed, public opinion veered round very sharply in
favour of Great Britain. The French are unpopular with the Arabs, who
compare the British policy of educating the populations under their protection
and eventually granting them their independence, as in the case of Egypt and
Iraq, with the exactly opposite system adopted by the French, whereby territories
protected by France become slowly but surely absorbed, as have been Algeria and
Senegal. There was much disappointment that, when the French authorities in
Syria declared for the Vichy Government, His Majesty's Government did not
immediately take over Syria and declare its independence. King Ibn Saud, the
Amir Faisal and a few of the more intelligent understood the difficulty and
delicacy of His Majesty's Government's position as regards Syria.
4. Whilst some may have favoured the Germans in the belief that the de\ i!
they did not know was better than the devil they knew, no Arab here has anything
but hatred and bitter contempt for the Italians, and Mussolini s declaration oi
war turned many in Britain's favour. One of the effects of Arab contempt for
the Italians has been to minimise the difficulties with which ^ His Majesty s
forces have had to contend in those theatres of war where Italian forces ha\e
been operating. The overrunning of British Somaliland did nothing to increase
Italian, and little to diminish British, prestige. It was realised that this nev
territory was only of value to the Italians from a propaganda point or view— tor
they had merely acquired a port which they could not use and a population wnicn
they could not feed—without command of the sea. _ i i _ ^
1 5. Britain's cause has also undoubtedly been much helped by Italy s choice
of representative in Jedda. Signor Sillitti has on more than one occasion
mistaken arrogance for forcefulness in his representations to the Amir Faisal
who has, in consequence, a deep personal dislike for hirm a lan ver a
propaganda (Ibn Saud has prohibited all written propaganda) has aiso been
particularly futile—a mixture of easily detectable lies and idle boasting. A v
are not only amused, they are offended that so low an opinion
their intelligence. The bombing of the Dhahran oil-fields no less than the self-
contradictoiy explanations of the incident, which Ibn Sand took to be meant as a
warning to him to remain neutral, did not help the^ Ttahan canse. matter
6. The feelings and opinions of the population . of f r ^ la
little as far as the Government is concerned. There is r "°
word is understood elsewhere. King Ibn Saud is e ^ ws 0 f ^ chief
dictates foreign policy, paying little or no hee
counsellors, Yusuf Yasin and Khalid -al-Qarqam nrlmirahlp pnd
7 King lb. S.u<r. that 1,
[17—59]