"ملف 61/11 IX (D 159) مسائل متنوعة خاصة بالحجاز ونجد" [و‎‎٨‎٠] (٣٩١/١٧٠)

this DOCUMENT is THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
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ARABIA. March 1, 1940.
CONFIDENTIAL. 1 , „ S ection 1.
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[E 945/252/25] Copy No.
Mr. Stonehewer-Bird to Viscount HaUfajc.—(Received March 1.)
(No. 8.)
My Lord, Jedda, February 6, 1940.
WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 21, 22 and 23 of the 5th February, I
have the honour to report that, on receipt of your Lordship's instructions,
I addressed to Ibn Saud two communications, of which copies are enclosed.
2. As immediately after the translation of these letters had been completed
the King called for me, I handed them to him in person, explaining that I did not
expect any reply until the following day, when he was also receiving me.
3. Ibn Saud, however, preferred to read the letters at once. He read the
letter about Dr. Grobba first, and expressed gratification at its terms. He made
no immediate reference to the question of guarantee.
4. The letter about arms and a credit was, I fear a bitter disappointment to
him. He said, immediately after reading it: "I cannot accept £100,000. My
people and my enemies outside my borders will say that that is all I am worth in
the eyes of my friends the British."' Still, let His Majesty's Government rest
assured that, even if he did not accept this sum or get the sum he wanted his
friendship was unalterable and. however much they might try, no foreign Power
could shake his friendship. I thanked him for this further mark of friendship
and said that our friendship for him was also so great that, had he felt obliged
to have a German Minister here, much as they would have deplored the necessity.
His Majesty's Government would not have allowed their relations to have been
affected by his action. Ibn Saud then touched on the question of the danger of his
position if the war spread and the need for him to be strong and well prepared.
£100,000 would be of no good to him. The point was not so much that he had
immediate needs as that he must know and be able to tell his people that there
existed funds on which he could draw if the need arose. He then got down to
details, and said that what he would like was for a sum of at least £800,000 to
be earmarked for his use during the war if and when he needed it. I replied
that His Majesty had seen from my note that I had been authorised not only to
offer a credit up to £100.000, but to state that His Majesty's Government would
also consider sympathetioally suggestions for the further strengthening of the
economic position of Saudi Arabia. His present request differed from his
original request, and I could only submit it to His Majesty's Government. As I
was to have the honour of a further interview on the morrow, we could talk again
on this matter. As regards the danger of his position, I said that his best
assurance lay in the fact that his interests and ours were identical; we had the
same interest in seeing a strong, united and independent Saudi Arabia as he had.
5. He then touched briefly on his relations with Iraq and Koweit, and
suggested that his Ministers, Sheikh Yusuf lasin and Sheikh Hafez Wahba,
might, if I agreed, conveniently call on me and try to reach an understanding on
the outstanding questions. I agreed and, as the time for prayer was approaching,
withdrew.
6. Before leaving the palace I asked Sheikh Hafez Wahba to call on me in
the afternoon and discuss the matter of credit, on which by then the King might
have expressed further views in private. I wished to discuss before my next
interview whether Ibn Saud had any intention of suggesting security for the
much larger loan for which he was now asking.
7. Hafez Wahba duly called, and I asked him whether, in his opinion, the
King would persist in his rejection of the offer of £100.000 credit for purchase of
food-stuffs in India. Hafez Wahba said yes. Ibn Saud was very sad. The sum
he had received would be compared with the very large sum loaned to Turkey, and
he would lose face in the eyes of his own people and his enemies alike. I explained
that no possible comparison could be drawn between the two transactions. The
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