"ملف 61/11 IX (D 159) مسائل متنوعة خاصة بالحجاز ونجد" [و‎‎٧‎٣] (٣٩١/١٥٦)

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14. The Government should be moving to keep pace with these changes and
Ibn Sand knows it. He has recently brought to Riyadh a large number of soldiers
and police in uniform. He flouted the priests and there was no resistance. It
was a test case and important. Since then there have been many incidents of
change which are startling to anyone who knew Riyadh even three years ago.
There is talk of the first aeroplane coming to Riyadh, piloted by a Saudi pilot,
Abdullah -al-Mandili, from the Hejaz. But with the relaxation of the stern
Wahabi code to suit changing conditions, there must be some concomitants of the
new order. There must be something like regular pay for State officials and
soldiers, and a better organised army and police force. Even rigid economy will
not provide a large enough margin for this.
15. This is not of great consequence to Great Britain, it seems to me, unless
there is some possibility of our requiring facilities from Ibn Saud later. In that
case we should do well to help him put his house in order now. It will be at least
two years before he begins to become richer and richer from oil royalties.
16. With regard to the facilities, those which occur to me are—
{a) The use of the lateral road along his northern frontier, from Koweit to
Transjordan, and either Haifa or Akaba. Repair of this road could
be carried out now if lie had the money and an engineer. The King, if
provided with these, would not object, as it would be advantageous
to him to have a good frontier road, as long as he felt our holding in
the Koweit Bay was unimpaired. If part of it were ceded by Koweit
to Iraq he would no doubt think differently.
(b) The use of landing grounds in North and North-Eastern Arabia, the
grounds being provided with petrol reserves. This would be
advantageous to the King, and if he were provided with the money he
might not object to making the necessary improvements and building
petrol tanks during the coming year, for the use of his own air force.
(c) The provision of meteorological data. His own air force will, or should,
presumably require this, and I do not see that there could be any grave
objections to a few Saudi Arabs being trained for this work in Egypt,
so that in case of need the Saudi Arab Government could arrange to
furnish the information to our air force, or, perhaps, to the Bahrein
Government for transmission.
17. There are probably other facilities which we might like to have given
to us. I have mentioned those which have occurred to me, and the preparation
for which need not affect Saudi Arabian neutrality, since they are consonant with
a normal programme of modernisation, which the King seems impatient to begin.
18. I believe that His Majesty is genuinely anxious to help if he can, but at
the same time he hopes that there will be incidental advantage to him. If we do
think that sooner or later we may require facilities, I suggest that the matter be
considered and dealt with expeditiously. Everything takes a long time in this
country.
19. If the possibility of our requiring Ibn Saud's " practical aid " is very
remote, I think we should lead him to understand this. It will make a difference
to his plans, and perhaps still the mind of that restless old campaigner, whom we
courted in the last Great War.
Yours. &c.
G. de GAURY.
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