"ملف 61/11 IX (D 159) مسائل متنوعة خاصة بالحجاز ونجد" [و‎‎٢‎٧] (٣٩١/٦٤)

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in Koweit has certainly been troublesome ? hut His Majesty 5 s Q-ovem
inent have repeatedly made it clear to the Iraqi Government that they
will not tolerate any modification of its status and this being so
they find it difficult to take this propaganda seriously in the
sense of supposing it will lead to any deliberate attempt to secure
•such a modifies Gion by force. His Majesty's Government would.,
however, welcome any further action which Ibn Saud might feel dis
posed to take to impress upon General Nuri the folly of the agita
tion and propaganda dire:ted against Koweit.
4,Apart from Kuweit question^ Iraqi Government may possibly
look forward to the day when Irao^ will? they hope s play a leading
part in a federation with other Arab States. But here again His
Majesty's Government have no reason to suppose that Iraqi Government
expect to create this federation by any but peaceful means.. Certainly
no such federation could be reated except after prolonged discussion
in which Ibn Saud would be able to make his views fully known«
5* In the opinion of His Majesty 1 s Government the Turkish
Government have no intention, apart from the Hatry, of attempting
to recover any portion of former Ottoman empire. Continued unrest
in Syria s especially in parts adjoining Turkey may. howevery make the
Turkish Government feel that some action similar to that whih has
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already resulted in the virtual cession of the Hatay is necessary in
Turkish interests 0 In the interests of Syria two things are im
portant if this is to be avoided. One is an agreement between France
and the Syrians. The other is that the politicians of Damascus,
who have hitherto dominated the Governments of Syria and have
successfully managed while in office to antagonise most of the
minorities ana many of the Arabs (e.g. of Aleppo), should in future
adopt methods which will van the confidence and goodwill of all
sections of the population.