'Mosul Question, Lausanne 1922-1923 and after - Papers, despatches, speeches - Hotel de la Mer at Lausanne - Correspondence about oil' [‎222r] (442/501)

1 Ift' ^iowth of the Kurdish national spirit, due largely to the presence of our
orces and the evidence of our administration in Mesopotamia and Southern Kurdistan,
is, in m_y opinion, largely answerable for this, and should be encouraged further by us as
tar as possible. J
The discussion of the Mosul frontier took place in January 1923 at the Lausanne
Conference, the arguments put forward by Ismet Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. for a Turkish occupation of the
toraier Mosul Vilayet down to Jebel Hamrin being completely refuted in a speech by
Lord Curzon at that time. r j
Among other details,® Lord Curzon remarked, on the point of strategy, that Ismet
Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. had said very little, and perhaps wisely. His Lordship added that Mosul would
be an excellent place for an army corps to be stationed. The southern frontier was
on y 60 miles from Bagdad. Was it not obvdous that a Turkish army placed at Mosul
wou d have Bagdad at its mercy, and could make an Arab kingdom well-nigh
impossible.
Such an argument holds with probably greater force to-day, as the Irak army is
still insufficiently strong to withstand any Turkish advance without strong backing
from us, especially as now in the minds of the Irak people the Lausanne Treaty was a
moral victory for the Turks in the sense that in their eyes they have been able to flout
the Western Powers, especially England, whom they thought so powerful, and to gain
the right to expel foreigners and infidels from their country at will.
I might even add that, in my opinion, the Irak army will never be able to stand
against the Turks without our support.
Or if I may put it more clearly, King Feisal’s Irak army with its British advisers
could not be trusted to stand for a moment against the Turks if the British garrison
were withdrawn. The advisers would be quickly swept aside and might suffer an
unfortunate fate.
Babylonia and Chaldaea were never able to stand against Assyria and invaders
from the north, and their descendants could not do it to-day. But the Irak levies,
composed of Kurds and Assyrians under the control of British officers, supported by
British military and especially air force, may be expected to show a determined front to
the lurks, and drive them out of their country and beyond, if called upon. The
Turkish arguments regarding Mosul were completely refuted in January at Lausanne,
but I scarcely think that sufficient attention was then directed to the very important
strategic importance of Rowanduz looked at in conjunction with Mosul.
Assuming that the adjoining district with the various Kurdish tribes are under
control, as they are at present under Sayyid Taha, Rowanduz stands as the key point
on a very important trade route into North-West Persia and Tabriz by Rayat and the
easy pass of the Garwa Sheikh on the frontier, up to which point the Russians
constructed a metalled road during the war.
It would he an easy feat for modern engineering to construct a motor road through
the Rowanduz gorge to join this road at the summit of the pass. Then there is the
possibility of constructing a railway from Bagdad through Kirkuk, Rania and the
Wazna Pass up the Lesser Zab Valley into Lahjan Plain, and thus entering North-West
Persia from the south-west. With Rowanduz in hostile hands such a line would be
impossible, and there is no other pass by which to cross the frontier ranges except near
the Tak-i-Girra, a long way to the south and heading away from North-West Persia.
With Rowanduz in our hands the Wazna Pass line would be securelv protected
on the north. As I have shown above, Rowanduz is the terminal of an important line
of 'furkish advance, both for military action and propaganda from Van through
Bashkala, Diza and Neri.
By this threatening attitude in recently massing troops at Neri an indication is
given that they appreciate the value of this line, and intend to utilise it as a lever in
their negotiations.
Then again, Rowanduz in hostile hands would always constitute a threat on the
right flank of our position at Mosul.
The Turks felt this acutely when the Russians advanced and captured the place
during the war, although they were prevented from moving far west of the town by
the Turks bolding some trenches on the crests above the gorge.
Moreover, when Rowanduz was in Turkish hands during the early part of this
present year we found to our cost that they used it as a centre for their intrigues and
propaganda, which penetrated as far south as Rania and Suleimanieh, and jeopardised
our whole position in Southern Kurdistan. Is it wise that we should then gratuitously
* “ Times” report of January 23, 1923.
[414 aa—3] C 2

'Mosul Question, Lausanne 1922-1923 and after - Papers, despatches, speeches - Hotel de la Mer at Lausanne - Correspondence about oil' [‎222r] (442/501)

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'Mosul Question, Lausanne 1922-1923 and after - Papers, despatches, speeches - Hotel de la Mer at Lausanne - Correspondence about oil' [‎222r] (442/501)

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