'Mosul Question, Lausanne 1922-1923 and after - Papers, despatches, speeches - Hotel de la Mer at Lausanne - Correspondence about oil' [‎222v] (443/501)

give them the opportunity of repeating these manoeuvres, which would become
intensified if permanent occupation were guaranteed? Even if we decided to hold
on to Mosul such action would mean a constant menace on the right flank of our whole
position in Mesopotamia and in Bagdad itself.
Then tigain, there is always the possibility in the future of a reorganised army and
an aggressive attitude on the part of Persia, which quite lately during the Khalizi
incident has shown an unwelcome desire to interfere in Irak affairs.
They seem not to have entirely forgotten that it was only some 300 years ago
when the Sultan wrested Bagdad from the Shah, and certainly, if the British left Irak,
these ambitions might revive, and it has even been rumoured that they might trade off
their province of Azerbaijan with the Turks in exchange for permission from them to
reoccupy Bagdad.
In such eventualities, or rather, to prevent their occurring, the strategic position
of Rowanduz is invaluable, as it provides a direct gateway from Mesopotamia into
North-West Persia, through which such actions might be controlled and a too restless
Persia brought to reason. A watch could also be kept on such as that on the frontier
at Bulakbashi further north.
Turning now to the part of the proposed frontier directly north of Mosul, we find
that in the correspondence stating the British objections of the conclusion of the
Franco-Turkish Agreement of the 20 th October, 1921, Lord Curzon, in a letter
to M. de Montille dated the 21 st November, 1921, said; “His Majesty’s Government
cannot remain indifferent to the manifest strategic importance to their position in
“ Irak of the return of the track of the Bagdad Railway to Turkey or of the transfer to
“ that Power of the localities of Jezire-bin-Omar and Nizibin.”
This warning has since been fully justified as the Turks have utilised Jezire as a
military station of importance directly threatening our outpost of Zakho.
Jezire in Roman times was Bezabde, and as the ancient walls still standing testify,
it was a frontier post of considerable importance against Parthia. This is due to its
geographical position at a point of crossing of the Tigris just after the river emerges
from a long series of difficult gorges upstream.
The Turks now seem to wish to emulate the Romans by constituting the place as
a frontier post threatening our position in Mosul, where we may be taken to represent
similar influence to that of Parthia.
The present Turkish garrison in Jezire is stated to be four battalions whose
military headquarters are in Diarbekr with which they are connected by a good road
through Nisibin and Mardin, a route, it may be mentioned, very vulnerable to air
attack. From Jezire northward along the Tigris left bank, is a rough track, but one
which the Turks have utilised for moving troops and even light artillery, up to Sairt
and thence to Bitlis.
By this route connection can be established with troops of the IXth Army Corps
and if necessary reinforcements brought from that force.
This jt may be remarked is the same corps which supplies the detachments in the
Baskala direction.
Also, the narrow defiles on the Tigris and the Bitlis Pass are not entirely immune
from air attack.
As regards the locality of Nisibin, this is clearly an important strategic
concentration point for an advance directed against Mosul, owing to its being the
railhead of the Bagdad Railway and also connected with Diarbekr through Mardin by
a good military road. From Nisibin to Mosid the route lies over open country, open to
air action.
In this connection it may be as well to note the recent attack on the French post
at Armida, between Nisibin and Ras-ul-Ain, when a Kurdish force of 2,000 men, stated
to be led by Turkish regular officers, barbarously murdered the garrison after surrender.
This incident indicates that the Angora Government are not above utilising disaffected
bands of Kurds for their own purposes, and rousing the latent sense of cruelty which
these semi-civilised races possess to serve their own ends.
The fact that machine-guns were supplied to the Kurds and Turkish regular officers
led them, makes the matter rather more serious than ordinary propaganda efforts
among the tribes.
Facing Jezire, at the northernmost corner of our mandate, we are fortunate in
possessing the strong defensive position of Zakho-Feishkhabur, to which I have alluded
in a former memorandum.
This definitely bars an advance from Jezire across the open plain of Nahrwan in
front of it, while the passage of the Khabur at Zakho, and the forcing of the defile of

'Mosul Question, Lausanne 1922-1923 and after - Papers, despatches, speeches - Hotel de la Mer at Lausanne - Correspondence about oil' [‎222v] (443/501)

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'Mosul Question, Lausanne 1922-1923 and after - Papers, despatches, speeches - Hotel de la Mer at Lausanne - Correspondence about oil' [‎222v] (443/501)

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