Coll 30/111 'British Naval Stations in: Establishments at Khor Quwai and Bahrain. Evacuation of Henjam and Basidu.' [‎27r] (58/1154)

of a sea-going combatant Naval Service, fetaiting for example witli
one or two sloops, the idea being that these may be maintained
definitely as men-of-war. If these vessels can be maintained as effi
cient men-of-war, they might replace one or more of the vessels of
the Imperial Navy in the Persian Golf, thereby redocing the amount
of the subsidy paid to the Imperial Government hi connection with
such vessels
{e) The Royal Indian Marine, so long as it remained a non-combatant force
(and its cost as such had increased by 1914 to nearly Rs. 67 lakhs One lakh is equal to one hundred thousand rupees
including the contributions), carried out services that were of direct
value to the Government of India in the way of transport, station
duties, lighting and buoying, etc. The conversion of the Royal
Indian Marine into a combatant force (the cost of which including
the contributions, originally came to some Rs. 68^ lakhs One lakh is equal to one hundred thousand rupees ), not only
deprived the Government of India of the services referred to, which now
have to be performed by other agencies, but also meant an increase
in their expenditure on naval defence by the whole amount of the
Marine budget, less the contribution previously paid, that is to say
an increase of about Rs. 50 lakhs One lakh is equal to one hundred thousand rupees or £375,000.
10. These facts by themselves would appear to present an unanswerable case,
on its merits, for a revision of the present arrangements and the actual abolition •
of the contribution ; for if it was accepted, as it was, that £100,000 was a sufficient
contribution in 1914, it can hardly be contended, even when due allowance has been
made for the alteration in the value of money since that date, that a contribution
of nearly five times that amount is not more than sufficient in 1934.
As already explained, however, it is not our object to reduce our expenditure,
but riierely to change its destination ; and quite apart from the arguments stated
above, there is another reason of substance why in our opinion such a course would
he justified,
11. In addition to the actual contribution of £100,000, there are various other
items that we now pay on Admiralty account, the average annual cost of which
comes to about £32.600. These are shown in Appendix III and it will be seen that
the majority of them are connected with the maintenance of the subsidised vessels
of the East Indies Squadron in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . With regard to one particular
item, namely oil fuel, the arrangement is obviously uneconomical, because we are
compelled to enter into a small separate contract for the supply of this oil and
therefore have to pay for it at higher rates than those secured by the Admiralty
under their own larger contract for the same article. Apart from this, it seems to
us to be wrong in principle, and it is a matter of particular difficulty under the
stabilised Defence budget system, to pay for supplies over the amount of which
we can exercise no control. For example, in 1929 all the prospective savings in the
Marine budget were swallowed up to meet an entirely unforeseen demand for
Rs. 46,000 for excess coal Above all, it seems to us that the arrangements
regarding the subsidised vessels in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , which date from 1869, were
based on a balance of interests in that region which has been entirely upset by the
course of events during the present century. It may have been a fact that in 1869
purely Indian interests predominated in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. ; but the position of Persia
herself, the independence of Iraq and the importance of the oil fields and the air
routes have rendered a new orientation necessary ; and it would be difficult to deny
that the presence of a naval force in that area is today far more a mattei of Impe
rial concern. It would indeed, as we stated in our Despatch No. 17, dated the 4th
September 1939, be a matter of considerable difficulty to reconcile Indian opinion
to the employment of the Royal Indian Marine in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. as one oi its
principal functions : the recent debate on the Indian Navy (Discipline) Dill disclosed
the suspicion with which the proposal to confer full naval status on the force is
still regarded ; and it is at least open to question whether the payments under dis
cussion would not invite serious criticism if their existence were more widely known
than happens to be the case. Here again, therefore, we see strong grounds for a
revision of the existing arrangements.