Coll 30/111 'British Naval Stations in: Establishments at Khor Quwai and Bahrain. Evacuation of Henjam and Basidu.' [‎27v] (59/1154)

12. We must now turn to the task that lies before us if we are to discharge
what we take to be our legitimate responsibilities m the matter of naval defence.
The first requisite in our opinion is to provide the equipment needed tor the execu
tion of local naval defence schemes and the personnel to use that equipment. It
lias already been estimated in consultation with the Admiralty that one Mark II
set and twenty-three Mark III sets of minesweeping gear, including winches, will
be required to equip the trawlers and other vessels which will be taken up from civil
sources on mobilisation for minesweeping duties at the Defended Ports, while a total
of 38 guns will be required for these vessels.
The next question is the provision of the requisite personnel. As you are
aware, the proposal to constitute a Royal Indian Marine Volunteer Reserve
to provide a reserve of officers, has been engaging our attention for some considera-
able time, but the seriousness of the financial situation has so far precluded us from
putting the scheme into force, although legislation was undertaken in 193a to pro
vide for the discipline of such a Reserve (see Act No. I of 1933). The scheme, it is
estimated, will eventually lead to a total extra expenditure of about Rs. 30,000
per annum, but with a view to reducing its initial and recurring cost for the present,
it would be possible to make a start with a smaller number of officers and to work
up gradually to the full establishment as circumstances permit. In addition, the
Flag Officer Commanding and Director, Royal Indian Marine, has submitted to us a
scheme for the formation of a Fleet Reserve of ratings intended primarily to man in
part the auxiliary craft to be taken up on the outbreak of war in the East and to
provide the trained key ratings for the operation of the minesweeping gear and
guns who, according to our naval advisers, will be indispensable if we are to obtain
good results from the commencement of any emergency. This scheme is estimated
to cost Rs. 83,000 per annum if annual training is to' be provided. The cost of
providing accommodation for the guns and mountings that we should require to
mamiain for the various classes of auxiliary vessels to be-taken up when the
Naval Control Service is put into operation in an emergency or for the arming of
merchant ships is now estimated at about Rs. 2,70,000"initial and Rs. 27,000
recurring per annum, including maintenance charges. We propose to make
further en q uiries to see whether these estimates can be reduced.
, I3 ' Hitherto we have confined onrselves entirely to the question of seaward
tl enrvh 7“ def Ti eS “T necessanl y complementary, and in discussing
foh 7 tf n r CfuTV* f rel r ant t0 point out tJlat in connection with the
„ !. Defended Ports Technical Committee in their report of 1929 made a
.cues of recommendations, which, if carried into effect in their entirety would
involve us m expenditure amounting to some Rs. 90 lakhs One lakh is equal to one hundred thousand rupees . Expenditure^! anv
0 C ] R 1 lid if y 0 " 1 - irm y Department letter No. 32801/1 (G S M
sphere of practical politick °so ffA 1 ^ ’ to - vour Mlitar y Secretary, is beyond the
at least Rs. 30 lakhs One lakh is equal to one hundred thousand rupees to give effectonhi tTsuXrTn d ’ ^ ^ to spen(i
defences as it is absolutely essential for us .,,1 ‘ nr ' 1< ‘ nflatlons as regards shore
not to be much reduced in value. fU Opt ou r seaward defences are
itself V^he^orceistoprogre^andlrow^ori t? P p sion pe Royal Indian Marine
cd to us by Vice-Admiral Sir Humnhrev W 1 6 11108 have been recommend-
we should like to look forward to a fleet of i W ^ n an d which we ourselves favour,
a reasonable number of years. It must he r ^ rK d )s i and four minesweepers within
appointments which are available under the p niember ed th a t at present the shore
of the main attractions of th Se^ department constitute one
senior officers. In course of time it Sef ms toZt "TiT!?* °P enil ^ f <* the more
will be held by T ndian members of the Mercanti le th&t t}lese . a PP 01 ntments
increasingly difficult to provide suitable rnnoo + r ! n ? '^ erv l ce an d it will become
combatant cadre of the service if it remains . tn i ents for seni °r officers within the
is an aspect of the case of which we must rm 1 S S resen t s i z e. This, however,
consideration for the present. * necessanl y> and can afford to, defer