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Coll 30/111 'British Naval Stations in: Establishments at Khor Quwai and Bahrain. Evacuation of Henjam and Basidu.' [26r] (56/1154)
The record is made up of 1 volume (572 folios). It was created in 24 Oct 1934-4 May 1937. It was written in English and Arabic. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .
Transcription
This transcription is created automatically. It may contain errors.
Phase 3.- The third phase is reached when, in addition to the Local Defence
Force, a sea-going squadron is provided by the Dominion for service
based on its own home station.
Phase 4 .—In the final stage, each State forming part of the Empire should be
capable of providing, in addition to the Local Defence Force and the
Squadrons for service in peace on its own home station, a subs
tantial part of the general scheme of naval defence, and more parti
cularly of the Main Fleet, whether in the shape of additional cruiser
squadrons or of capital ship units.”
W e have, m practice, tended to pass over the first stage and to concentrate our
attention on the second and third stages referred to above. W r e attach no less
importance than our predecessors to the considerations that actuated Lord
Rawlinson’s Committee in making their recommendations. In fact we realise
that any reduction in the number of sea-going ships of the Royal Indian Marine
would have disastrous effects on the future of the force and would largely nullify
the progress of the last few years. It would be a retrograde step that we should be
most reluctant to take even in the last resort; and it is one that is opposed no less
by the Naval Commander-in-Chief than by ourselves.
5. At this point, however, financial considerations emerge and, as usual, domi
nate the situation. If there is one thing more certain than another, it is that we
shall be unable for several years to come materially to increase our Defence expendi
ture by launching into new developments. However much we may agree therefore
as to the necessity for devoting more attention to what should, perhaps, have been
the first stage in India's naval development, however desirable it may also be even
tually to expand the strength of the Royal Indian Marine by adding extra ships,
there can be no question of augmenting our existing Marine budget for either of
those purposes at the present moment. It is a question rather of the Relative
importance of the various objects in view and the best possible allocation of funds
between them without raising the present general level of expenditure. That level
may be taken to be in the neighbourhood of Rs. 65
lakhs
One lakh is equal to one hundred thousand rupees
, to cover both effective
and non-effective charges ; and when the money available in the Kidderpore Dockyard
Suspense Fund is exhausted, after we have paid the full cost of the new sloop
“ Indus ”, the most that we shall be able to afford for any programme of replace
ment or new construction is some annual contribution towards the establishment
of a Sinking Fund for the purpose.
6. On this understanding we have carefully examined the structure of our
present Marine budget and have come to the conclusion that we must raise again
the whole question of the contribution of £100,000 and the other payments that
we now make towards the cost of His Majesty’s Navy. The suggestion was made
in our Marine Despatch No. 17, dated the 4th September 1930, that the time had
come to review these payments, but later (see our telegram No. 733-S., dated the
11th March 1931) we agreed that it would be inopportune to pursue the matter
pending the examination by the Capitation Tribunal of the larger question of a
contribution from Imperial revenues towards the cost of the Army in India. The
Tribunal has now given its award and we understand that His Majesty s Govern
ment did not press the question of naval expenditure in the course of its proceed
ings. The position therefore appears to be open for examination on its merits
and we desire to give a fuller exposition of our view’s with regard to it than we have
attempted since our Finance Department Despatch No. 260, dated the 23rd July
1914.
7. At the outset we desire to make it clear that our object in raising the ques
tion is not in any way to divest ourselves of responsibility or to reduce the amount
of money that we now devote towards naval defence in general. On the other
hand our desire is to accept the fullest possible responsibility for the local defence
of Indian ports and harbours in accordance with what we conceive to be the wishes
of the Admiralty and to give effect to that responsibility in the most practical way
by spending money in the discharge of it. We freely acknowledge the immense
MS 6 ADM
About this item
- Content
The file concerns the evacuation of the British naval stations at Henjam [Jazīreh-ye Hengām] and Basidu [Bāsaʻīdū, Qeshm], in Iran (generally referred to in the papers as Persia), and the transfer of naval facilities to a new main station at Bahrain (also spelled Bahrein) and a subsidiary station at Khor Quwai (also spelled Khor Kuwai), Musandam, in the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. The British Government had become aware that the legal basis for their occupation of Basidu was very weak, and that it would probably be impossible to oppose a determined effort by the Iranian Government to assert their claims to Basidu. In addition, between 1932 and 1934 there had been a change in the relative importance to the United Kingdom of the Arab and Iranian coasts of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. ; the Arab side was now viewed as being more important, as a result of (a) the transfer of the air route to the Arab Coast in 1932, and (b) the discovery of oil at Bahrain, and its probable existence in other parts of the Arab coast. For these reasons, it was felt desirable to move the base of British naval operations in the area (Foreign Office memorandum, folios 221-225).
The main correspondents are the Foreign Office; the Admiralty; senior British naval officers; HM Minister, Tehran (Hughe Montgomery Knatchbull Hugesson); and the Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. (Lieutenant-Colonel Trenchard Craven William Fowle).
The papers include: discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of establishing a naval station at Khor Quwai (folios 539-571); issues raised by Muscat's position as an independent state, and the Anglo-French Declaration of 1862 (folios 529-538); minutes of meetings at the Foreign Office and the Admiralty; the question of the reaction of the Iranian Government; discussion of the announcement of the withdrawal; negotiations with the Sultan of Muscat [Sa'īd bin Taymūr Āl Bū Sa'īd] over Khor Quwai; the removal of stores from Henjam; the question of the protection of British cemeteries at Henjam and Basidu (e.g. Iranian assurances, folio 126); descriptions of the evacuation of Henjam and Basidu in April 1935 in intelligence reports and correspondence; and the expression of gratitude by British Government to the Ruler of Bahrain (Shaikh Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifah [Shaikh Ḥamad bin ‘Īsá Āl Khalīfah]) over the assistance given by the Government of Bahrain in construction work for the new station at Bahrain (folios 39-54).
The Arabic language content of the file consists of a single item of correspondence on folio 40.
The file includes a divider, which gives a list of correspondence references contained in the file by year. This is placed at the back of the correspondence.
- Extent and format
- 1 volume (572 folios)
- Arrangement
The papers are arranged in approximate chronological order from the rear to the front of the file.
- Physical characteristics
Foliation: the foliation sequence (used for referencing) commences at the inside front cover with 1, and terminates at the inside back cover with 574; these numbers are written in pencil, are circled, and are located in the top right corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. side of each folio.
- Written in
- English and Arabic in Latin and Arabic script View the complete information for this record
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Coll 30/111 'British Naval Stations in: Establishments at Khor Quwai and Bahrain. Evacuation of Henjam and Basidu.' [26r] (56/1154), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/12/3840, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100080227752.0x000039> [accessed 19 June 2026]
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- Reference
- IOR/L/PS/12/3840
- Title
- Coll 30/111 'British Naval Stations in: Establishments at Khor Quwai and Bahrain. Evacuation of Henjam and Basidu.'
- Pages
- front, back, spine, edge, head, tail, front-i, 2r:5v, 7r:21v, 23r:37v, 38v:51v, 55r:60v, 61v:64v, 65v:69v, 70v:72v, 73v:81v, 82v, 84r:102v, 103v:119v, 122r:125v, 126v:138v, 139v, 140v:149v, 151r:172v, 173v:452v, 452ar:452av, 453r:573v, back-i
- Author
- East India Company, the Board of Control, the India Office, or other British Government Department
- Usage terms
- Open Government Licence