Coll 30/111 'British Naval Stations in: Establishments at Khor Quwai and Bahrain. Evacuation of Henjam and Basidu.' [‎25v] (55/1154)

l ! W '■
affaolipd as ADDendix II) prescribing the duties of the Royal Indian Marine after
ft“a“Sa 3 a combatant force and defining the respective spheres of
responsibility of the Naval Commander-m-Chief and the Flag Officer Com
manding the Indian Force.
3. The result of the difference of opinion is that practically no progress has
been made in providing the personnel,, the minesweeping gear and the guns re
quired to man and equip the vessels that will have to be taken up m war m order
to carry out the various local naval defence schemes ; and, while the Flag Officer
Commanding, Royal Indian Marine, is charged with the responsibility of prepar
ing those schemes and having them ready to put into execution in an emergency,
in actual practice the schemes are only ready on paper and the bulk of our Marine
expenditure is devoted to the maintenance of our sea-going sloops and to the train
ing of their persoimel in gunnery, minesweeping, signalling and other combatant
duties. Valuable as this work undoubtedly is—and we rely here, not only on the
opinion of our own immediate advisers, but also on the views expressed by
successive Naval Commanders-in-Chief who have' voiced their appreciation of
the remarkable progress made by the Royal Indian Marine during the last five or
six years—we cannot deny that there is an element of inconsistency in the accept
ance on our part of responsibility for the preparation of local naval defence
schemes and professions of inability to carry them into practical effect. It must
be realised that under the War Orders of the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East
Indies Squadron, whose flag the Indian Force will join on the outbreak of hosti
lities, specific duties have already been allotted to the sloops of the Royal Indian
Marine, at Trincomalee, Colombo, Aden and in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , and none of
our ships will be directly employed on the defence of Indian ports and harbours.
We do not deny that this allocation of duties may be the best possible in the
interests of India and the Empire as a whole. That is a matter for the decision
of the naval authorities ; and we are gratified to find that they propose to entrust
important and responsible duties to our Force. But the result will be that the
defence of Indian ports and the duty of keeping their approaches free from mines
will fall to locally found craft, which will have to be manned and equipped on
the outbreak of war ; and when the immense importance of these duties is taken
into consideration at Defended Ports which may form the bases of a British Expedi
tionary Force, we are forced to the conclusion that urgent and effective action is
required to put matters on a proper footing. We have therefore given the whole
matter our most earnest and careful consideration.
4. If reasons for the present position are tb be sought, they will be found to lie
partly m political and, partly, in financial considerations. In the first place the
Departmental ( ommittee under Lord Rawlinson, which examined the question of
as ? tdKeZ&Zu
iii paragraph 3 ot their Report:— We cannot insist too strongly on the shins
siasm luke^iU rndtlwl^f ri?“^ a sea -g° in g &**■ Efficiency and enthu-
“ ?K rt ’ ?n d practises n0thill S
of the Committee has in fact tended to Produce a rTvisal reC ° mi ! le f C,ati T S
which, according to the Committee of Imneriffi DpffJ the normal stages by
nion Navies should proceed In P T n P Defence the development of Domi-
March 1928, the ordffiary course of N °/ dated the 12 th
words Y UISe ° f dCTelo Pment was stated in the following
and
parations are made for the next phase L , At . the san , le tmie > P™-
personnel for a sea-going force. P by begmmn § the training of
«■* « h a. ™-
This phase involves the odahv^ f aS ’ “ 0I,p0Sed to local defe “ce.
m the first instance it may be f a '§ oin g shi P s > and
to obtain both the shins them^l ^ j ^ na ! lcla l an d other reasons,
personnel from GreltX&l^ff^’A an -I rate * of
training, repair and fuelhno- ffimin: b 1 ° ^ t lls P^ ase the necessary
m preparation for tb“ “ SWd,wll . v be buil t U P
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