Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎147v] (298/380)

Persian policy. So long as we hold India, we cannot afford to disinterest ourselves
in the affairs of her western neighbour.. If Persia were a well-organised State under
a stable administration, we might be content to take a merely passive interest in her
affairs. Unfortunately, the reverse is the case. Persia, as a body politic, is in the
last stages of decay and decomposition. The Government at Tehran is hopelessly
weak and inefficient. Cabinets follow one another in rapid succession, but little
serious attempt is ever made to remedy the confusion in public affairs. The Shah’s
writ scarcely runs beyond the capital itself, and even there the Government has little
real authority over the faction of irresponsible “ democrats,” who control what passes
for public opinion, and resort, when necessary, to assassination as a means of
achieving their purpose. It was only by foreign assistance that even a semblance of
tranquillity was maintained in the interior before the war ; and there is no reason to
suppose that it can be maintained without such assistance when peace conditions
have been restored. Anglo-Uussian rivalry has played its part in the past in
preventing any satisfactory solution of the Persian question , but it ought not to be
impossible, now that our rival is removed, to devise some means of restoring
conditions to a reasonable degree of stability. It is most desirable, in Indian
interests, that this end should be attained, and attained in a manner and by methods
that involve the least drain on Indian military resources and the least increase of
Indian financial and military responsibilities.
34. India’s primary requirement is that Persia should enjoy sufficient political
stability to make her a tolerable neighbour. How far this ideal falls short of
realisation at the present time may be illustrated by the following extract from a
recent telegram from the British Minister at Teheran (27th November 1918) :—“ Owing
“ to inveterate corruption, extortion and injustice on the part of the ruling classes,
“ from the Shah downwards, the condition of the peasantry is admittedly
“ deplorable. At present Persia is only saved from bankruptcy by our financial
“ help and from active disorder by the presence of our troops. Were these
“ safeguards to be withdrawn on the signature of peace, North Persia
“ must become a prey to complete chaos, if not to. violent revolution . . . .
“ In our own interests we cannot contemplate such a disquieting prospect in a
border State. Sir P. Cox might have added that, in the interests of the Persians
themselves—for whose welfare we have, by our past acts, incurred a certain degree of
moral responsibility we cannot acquiesce in the indefinite continuance of present
conditions. 1 he difficulty is that no substantial reform is possible without effective
foreign assistance, and that effective foreign assistance is just what is most
unpalatable to 1 ersian public opinion. 1 here are,.however, indications of a change
of sentiment in this respect. Sir P. Cox, in the telegram already quoted, reports
that aconsideiable section of the Persian public recognise that “a very wide measure
“convinced that the only completely satisfactory solution will be to have a trained
“ administrator in control of every department of the State and in every provincial
“Government. r I his would be lor a specified time of years during which Persians
would be associated \\ ith those administrators and trained with a view to takin 0-
“ their place in due course.”
35. Such, stated very briefly, is the problem. It is to nobody’s interest, least of
all that oi the Persians themselves, that Persia should be given over to anarchy
and chaos. Yet, if she is left to her own devices, that is her inevitable fate. The
question is one that concerns the general interests of civilisation, and as such* might
suitably form the subject of international discussion. Supervision, based oilman
international “ mandate,” whether proceeding from the Peace Conference or from 1 a
future “ League of Nations,” would probably be less distasteful to the Persians (and
to Muhammadan opinion generally) than assislance proffered by a single Power on its
own account, particularly if such supervision were imposed tin Sir P. Cox’s words)
“ for a specified period and in return for full guarantees of her independence and
integrity, and safeguards against unscrupulous exploitation.” It is even possible
that the Persian Government might be induced to make a spontaneous request for
assistance on such terms. 1
36. There remains the
choice fell upon ourselves—
question, who is to be the supervisory Power? It the
who are beyond all question the nation best qualified for